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REVITALIZING THE QUIET NINTH AMENDMENT: 
DETERMINING UNENUMERATED RIGHTS AND 
EliMINATING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Christopher J. Schmidtt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Do people have a constitutional right to clone themselves? Does an 
individual have a constitutional right to receive health care? One day, 
these issues may be adjudicated in the United States' federal court 
system, most likely the United States Supreme Court, but what consti-
tutional provision will govern the dispute? Under current law, the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment determines if the 
liberty interest contained therein encompasses the proposed right. 
The text of the Constitution, however, requires that the Ninth Amend-
ment govern whether the people retain an unenumerated right. 
Part I of this article discusses the development of the substantive 
due process doctrine. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have 
parallel provisions preventing the federal and state governments, re-
spectively, from denying "life, liberty, and property without due pro-
cess of law."1 The substantive due process doctrine turns due process 
from a mechanism ensuring procedural fairness when the govern-
ment attempts to deny life, liberty, or property, into a fourth pro-
tected entity that determines whether or not fundamental rights exist 
that are not enumerated within the Constitution. Under the doctrine, 
due process has some "substantive" quality that forms and then falls 
under the liberty provision. It is this judicial creation, void of text-
based constitutional support, that has provided unpredictable legal 
standards and results because it can be bent to meet any ends neces-
sary. However, this inconsistency can be easily eradicated by applying 
the text of the Ninth Amendment to determine unenumerated rights 
issues. 
Sparse analysis of the Ninth Amendment by both courts and schol-
ars makes it difficult to determine where Ninth Amendmentjurispru-
dence stands. The Ninth Amendment states that "[t]he enumeration 
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people."2 In contemporary constitu-
t B.A., University of Maryland, 1998; J.D., Widener University School of Law, 
2001. Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. Many thanks to Michael Farlow for 
reviewing a prior draft of this article. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XN. 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
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tional discussions, the analytical process generally requires sifting 
through a tremendous amount of material to reach a result. The 
Ninth Amendment is almost the direct opposite. Until 1965, only 
about ten Supreme Court cases mentioned the Ninth Amendment, 
and no case has relied on it as an exclusive or primary rule in its deci-
sion.3 The spark igniting the Ninth Amendment debate arose from 
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,4 in 
which he found a right to privacy to exist under the amendment.5 
That opinion created a slight commotion in legal circles. Since then, 
the Ninth Amendment received serious attention as a possible source 
for protecting individual rights within the Constitution.6 The schol-
arly interest in the amendment fostered some intense and disputa-
tious bursts of intellectual discourse. 7 The United States Supreme 
Court, however, has sparingly applied the Ninth Amendment, and the 
substantive due process standard remains in full effect.8 Therefore, 
the time is right to sort through this body of material and develop a 
clear understanding of the Ninth Amendment with an appropriate 
test to analyze whether or not certain actions or behaviors are recog-
nizable as unenumerated rights, while eliminating the judicially cre-
ated substantive due process doctrine. 
Part II of this article examines the text of the Ninth Amendment. 
The plain meaning of the amendment sanctions its authority to adju-
dicate whether an unenumerated right exists warranting constitu-
tional recognition. This contradicts current jurisprudence adopting a 
substantive due process component in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The language of the Ninth Amendment cannot be contradicted or 
supported by any attempt to analyze what the amendment's drafter, 
James Madison, thought the amendment means. His alleged view, 
which we cannot be sure of, cannot trump the text of the amendment. 
Because the text itself is so important, relying on the Founders' intent, 
particularly on Madison, to support conclusions about the Ninth 
Amendment's meaning is a dangerous fallacy. The one document the 
Founders agreed upon was the text of the Ninth Amendment. That 
text governs unenumerated rights, not what a modern-day scholar 
thinks Madison thought the Ninth Amendment meant. Because the 
3. Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 69 
IND. LJ. 759,761 (1994). 
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
5. Id. at 486-87. 
6. See generally Gregory Allen, Ninth Amendment and State Constitutional Rights, 
59 ALB. L. REv. 1659, 1660 (1996) (citing Russell L. Caplan, The History 
and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, in RANDY E. BARNETr, THE RIGHTS 
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMEND-
MENT 243 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989)). 
7. Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the 
US. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. 
U.L. REv. 550, 622-23 (1992). 
8. See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. 
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Ninth Amendment grants the people unenumerated rights, the judici-
ary has a duty to recognize them when federal or state governments 
infringe upon those rights.9 That is not a form of judicial activism 
because the Constitution grants the people unenumerated rights; 
thus, the judiciary has a duty to recognize and protect them from un-
constitutional infringement. Natural law principles, the virtually un-
disputed philosophical backdrop of the Founders, and the 
Constitution, further support an interpretation of the Ninth Amend-
ment granting the people rights not expressly enumerated elsewhere 
in the Constitution.10 
I evaluate unenumerated rights under the Ninth Amendment inter-
pretive paradigm listed above. My approach flows from the text of the 
Ninth Amendment and blends the original meaning of the text with 
current norms to determine if a proposed unenumerated right war-
rants constitutional recognition. If a preponderance of the evidence 
shows the proposed right deserves constitutional protection, it will be 
considered an unenumerated right and be free of government regula-
tion absent a narrowly tailored, compelling government interest. If a 
preponderance of the evidence shows the proposed right does not 
deserve constitutional protection, it will not be considered an 
unenumerated right and the federal government can regulate it if it is 
rationally based on a legitimate government interest. This stable, text-
based approach will eliminate the flawed substantive due process test 
and provide more consistent and credible standards and results. 
Part III of this article explains problems in the traditional reading 
of the Ninth Amendment. That approach ignores the plain meaning 
of the Ninth Amendment for a structural interpretation of its content. 
This view proposes that the Ninth Amendment only ensures that the 
rights enumerated in the first eight amendments are protected from 
the federal government's limited powers. This contradicts the Ninth 
Amendment's express grant of unenumerated rights retained by the 
people. The traditional approach also neglects to apply the Ninth 
Amendment against the states, although as a portion of the Bill of 
Rights it is a privilege and immunity of citizenship that no state can 
abridge under the Fourteenth Amendment. II 
State constitutional provisions adopting language mirroring the 
Ninth Amendment prove that the traditional reading of the Ninth 
Amendment is inaccurate. If the traditional approach is correct, and 
the Ninth Amendment forever places a line between federal rights 
and powers, thereby leaving the remaining power to the states, then 
why does any state need to repeat that proclamation in its state consti-
tution? Because the majority of states adopt a Ninth Amendment like 
9. See Allen, supra note 6, at 1662. 
10. See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. 
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also infra Part II.B. 
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declaration, we know that the amendment grants the people rights 
that were not mentioned in the Constitution. Therefore, state consti-
tutions following that mantra directly protect their citizens by grant-
ing them unenumerated rights not present in their state constitutions. 
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND NINTH AMENDMENT 
LAW 
A. The Development of Substantive Due Process Law 
In Lochner v. New York,12 an owner of a bakery was convicted under a 
New York state law that prohibited employers from requiring or al-
lowing their employees to work in excess of a sixty hour work week, or 
more than ten hours a day.13 The Court overturned the conviction 
finding that entering into an employment contract was a substantive 
right under the Fourteenth Amendment and constituted a protected 
liberty interest. 14 The Court's legal trick turned the procedural com-
mand of the Due Process Clause - that life, liberty, or property could 
not be taken without sufficient procedural safeguards - into a substan-
tive form of due process wherein unenumerated rights could be 
based. Is 
The Court's assertion that the right to enter into an employment 
contract was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment was inaccurate 
because the amendment does not explicitly provide for such a protec-
tion. I6 The Court "manufactured a constitutional right ... out of its 
substantive formulation of due process."17 The decision, devoid of a 
textual foundation, stands as a startling example of judicial interven-
tion into the political choices of the legislature; thus, it serves as a 
cautionary tale of the inappropriate exercise of judicial power. lS Loch-
ner effectively immortalized the substantive due process mechanism 
that is still the standard for analyzing claims regarding unenumerated 
constitutional rights today. 19 
12. 198 U.S. 45, 46 n.l (1905). 
13. Marc C. Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due 
Process A nalysis of Personal Autonomy Rights, 48 UCLA L. REv. 85, 144 (2000) 
(citing Lochner, 198 U.S. at 46 n.l). 
14. Id. at 145 (citing Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57). 
15. Id. The precise birth of substantive due process is difficult to ascertain. Its 
origin may be Dred Scott v. Sanford, 313 U.S. 236 (1857) (noting that a slave 
who went to a free state was not free upon return to the slave state). The 
Court read into the Constitution the legality of slavery forever and denied 
the federal and state governments from preventing slavery. See ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCrION OF THE LAw 32 
(Collier MacMillan 1990). 
16. Id. at 145. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 146 (citing Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes,J., dissenting)). 
19. Niles, supra note 13, at 145 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
719-36 (1997)) (" [A] pplying substantive due process analysis in determin-
ing that there is no constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide."). 
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Mter Lochner, substantive due process inappropriately developed 
into "the primary textual basis for recognizing or rejecting 
'unenumerated' fundamental rights."20 In Meyer v. Nebraska, 2 I the 
Court struck down a Nebraska statute preventing instructors from 
teaching students foreign languages before a student passes eighth 
grade.22 The Court concluded that individuals have "certain funda-
mental rights which must be respected."23 In so doing, the Court held 
that the right of the instructor to teach, and the parent's right to ob-
tain instruction for their child was within the liberty component of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.24 The words of the Court's opinion show 
the illogical nature of substantive due process.25 A fundamental right 
of the instructor and parents was at stake, not necessarily their lib-
20. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1, 56 
(1995). As noted in the Fleming's article, the following cases adopt the 
substantive due process analysis to determine if an unenumerated or funda-
mental right exists: West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1943) ("liberty of conscience and freedom of thoughn; Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) ("freedom of association, 
including both expressive association and intimate association"); Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) ("right to live with one's 
family, whether nuclear or extended"); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 
629-30 (1969) ("right to travel or relocate"); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 
95-96 (1987) ("right to marry"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) 
("right to marry"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("right 
to procreate"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) ("right 
within marital association to use contraceptives"); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("right of individual, married or single, to use contra-
ceptives"); Careyv. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) ("right 
to distribute contraceptives"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) 
("right of a woman to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy"); Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) ("reaffirming 'central hold-
ing' of Rne"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,400 (1923) ("right to direct 
the education of children"); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 
(1925) ("right to direct the upbringing and education of children"); Wash-
ington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,221-22 (1990) ("right to bodily integrity, in 
particular, to avoid unwanted administration of anti-psychotic drugs"); 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) ("right to bodily integrity, 
in particular, to be protected against the extraction of evidence obtained by 
'breaking into the privacy' of a person's mouth or stomach"); Cruzan v. 
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) ("assuming for 
purposes of the case a 'right to die"'); Id. at 339-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
("arguing that decisions about death are a matter of individual con-
science"); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) ("right of 
privacy includes both an 'individual interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters' and an 'interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions"'); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("right 
to receive ideas and to be free from unwanted government intrusions into 
the privacy of one's home"). Id. at 7 n.27 
21. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
22. [d. at 400. 
23. [d. at 401. 
24. [d. at 400. 
25. [d. at 399-400. 
174 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 32 
erty.26 If an unenumerated right is at issue, then the Ninth Amend-
ment governs the adjudication of that legal claim.27 In Pierce v. Society 
of the Sisters of the Holy Names,28 the Court invalidated an Oregon stat-
ute requiring parents and/or guardians of children to send them to 
public schoo1.29 The Court stated that "rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution may not be abridged"30 and "those who nurture [a child] and 
direct his destiny have the right ... to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations."31 Although unenumerated rights were at is-
sue, the Court followed Meyer and based its decision on the liberty 
component of the Due Process Clause.32 A Connecticut statute 
preventing the use of contraceptive devices and preventing medical 
advice related to using those devices was not substantively addressed 
by the Court in Poe v. Ullman.33 The Court dismissed the plaintiff's 
declaratory judgment action because the statute had not been en-
forced and there was no realistic fear of future prosecution.34 
As the Warren Court began to address more fundamental rights is-
sues, it first curtailed its own power to review legislative enactments. 
In Ferguson v. Skrupa,35 the Court upheld a Kansas statute that author-
ized only lawyers to engage in debt adjustment.36 The Court affirmed 
its full step back from Lochner-type decisions, announcing that it would 
not strike down laws that it finds are unreasonable, unwise, or incom-
patible with some economic or social philosophy.37 The Court recog-
nized that states have the ability to legislate "so long as their laws do 
not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of 
some valid federal law."38 The Court appropriately returned to the 
original constitutional proposition, in which it does not substitute its 
own beliefs for the judgment of the legislature. 39 
Eliminating the "super-Iegislature"4o position of the Court in Loch-
ner-type substantive due process claims returned the Court to a textu-
ally definitive starting point for substantive due process issues - or did 
26. Meyer, 262 u.s. at 400. 
27. If the Court determined that an enumerated right existed under the Ninth 
Amendment, the right would have applied against Nebraska through the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. 
28. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 535. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 534-35. 
33. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
34. Id. at 508-09. 
35. 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 729-30. 
38. Id. at 730-31 (quoting Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & 
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949)). 
39. Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 730. 
40. Id. at 731. 
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it? The Court only addressed its inability to overturn otherwise consti-
tutional statutes that were unwise, improvident, or out of harmony 
with a particular school of thought. 41 The Court did not address a 
return to the constitutional underpinnings of un enumerated rights 
issues found in the Ninth Amendment. That foundation, if properly 
laid, would have to come in Griswold v. Connecticut.42 
B. The Ninth Amendment Affirmatively Enters the Substantive Due Process 
Analysis 
The hallmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut forever intertwined sub-
stantive due process and Ninth Amendment jurisprudence. At issue 
before the Court was the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that 
prohibited the use or assistance in use of contraceptive devices.43 The 
Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it "concerns a 
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several funda-
mental constitutional guarantees."44 The decision concluded, "spe-
cific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and sub-
stance."45 The Court found that various guarantees in the Constitu-
tion create zones of privacy, such as the right of association in the First 
Amendment, the right to prohibit the quartering of soldiers in homes 
in times of peace in the Third Amendment, the right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, the 
right against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment, and the 
Ninth Amendment.46 
The Court's mention of the Ninth Amendment as support for its 
conclusion that a marital zone of privacy exists creates a confusing 
form of reasoning. The Court enunciates the specific rights held 
under the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments that create a 
zone of privacy.47 However, it only quotes the text of the Ninth 
Amendment; it does not explain what right under the Ninth Amend-
ment helps mold the zone of privacy recognized.48 Furthermore, the 
Court does not explain or state anything else in reference to the 
Ninth Amendment. Its text is left dangling before the curious 
reader's eyes as though awaiting some explanation. The reason no 
explanation exists is because the Court cannot give one. It cannot 
explain how the Ninth Amendment can support recognizing a zone of 
privacy under the liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment 
41. Id. at 731-32 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 
(1955». 
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
43. Id. at 480. 
44. Id. at 485. 
45. Id. at 484. 
46. Id. 
47. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
48. Id. 
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because the text and meaning of the Ninth Amendment precludes 
that conclusion. The specific guarantee under the Ninth Amendment 
is that the people retain unenumerated rights.49 Therefore, the Ninth 
Amendment recognizes the zone of privacy that encompasses a mari-
tal couple's choice to use contraceptive devices. The Ninth Amendment 
is an authoritative source g;uaranteeing the zone of privacy, not a persuasive 
source supporting the constitutional recognition of a zone of privacy through a 
provision of another amendment. 
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion,joined by Chief Justice War-
ren and Justice Brennan, supports the right of marital privacy through 
precedent and the language and history of the Ninth Amendment.5o 
Justice Goldberg caught the majority's curt mention of the Ninth 
Amendment as well and explained that his opinion will "add ... words 
to emphasize the relevance of that amendment to the Court's hold-
ing."51 He argued that "[t]he language and history of the Ninth 
Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution believed that 
there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmen-
tal infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights spe-
cifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments."52 
While Justice Goldberg fell into the all-too-familiar trap of relying on 
James Madison's alleged intent behind the Ninth Amendment, he 
posited the first substantial judicial body of work advocating a Ninth 
Amendment adjudication of unenumerated rights issues. 53 He con-
cluded that: 
To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-
rooted in our society as the right of privacy in marriage may 
be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many 
words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to 
ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatso-
ever. Moreover, a judicial construction that this fundamen-
tal right is not protected by the Constitution because it is not 
mentioned in explicit terms by one of the first eight amend-
ments or elsewhere in the Constitution would violate the 
Ninth Amendment, which specifically states that "[t]he enu-
meration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people."54 
49. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people."). 
50. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-87 (Goldberg,j., concurring). 
51. Id. at 487 (Goldberg, j., concurring). 
52. Id. at 488 (Goldberg, j., concurring). 
53. Id. at 490-91. 
54. [d. at 491-92 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX). 
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As a breakthrough opinion, Justice Goldberg hedged on the limits 
of Ninth Amendment jurisprudence. He did not proclaim enough of 
an authoritative Ninth Amendment jurisprudence to evaluate 
unenumerated rights claims. In addition, he conceded too much and 
inaccurately provided, "I do not mean to imply that the Ninth Amend-
ment is applied against the states by the Fourteenth."55 
To ensure, however, that unenumerated rights receive protection 
from state infringement, the Ninth Amendment must be applied 
against the states. While it must be admitted that the Bill of Rights was 
only intended to protect citizens against federal intrusion, and that 
the states had the ability to determine how they would protect individ-
ual liberties, 56 the incorporation doctrine - holding that particular 
portions of the Bill of Rights are applicable to the states through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - is a fictional ju-
dicial creation. The Court's selective incorporation of some, but not 
all, rights to the states, creates a slot machine theory where some 
rights are in and some are OUt.57 The Ninth Amendment has never 
been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.58 But the 
Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, states that "[n]o State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the United States .... "59 That clause is "meant to 
do the work of incorporation."6o The clause "is an 'eminently reason-
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg,]., concurring). 
See generally Sanders, supra note 3, at 774-75; Laurence G. Sager, You Can 
Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth. But What on Earth 
Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 239, 245 (1988) 
(noting that the Bill of Rights only restricted the federal government, it did 
not restrict the States); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Ninth Amendment and the 
'Jurisprudence of Original Intent," 74 GEO. LJ. 1719, 1730 (1986) (noting that 
most commentators agree that the Ninth Amendment was originally meant 
to apply to the federal government). 
Sanders, supra note 3, at 775 (citing Justice Frankfurter in HENRY]. ABRA-
HAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 57 (4th ed. 1982». A list of the rights incor-
porated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
found in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). 
Calvin R. Massey, The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment and its Implications for 
State Constitutional Law, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 1229,1250 (1990). 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Unfortunately, the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause is virtually insignificant in constitutional law. Currently, the privi-
leges and immunities of state citizens are not intended to have any addi-
tional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1872). Privileges and immunities "owe their exis-
tence to the federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or 
its laws." Id. at 79. Thus, the Court essentially deleted the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause from the Fourteenth Amendment. Akhil Reed Amar, 
The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REv. 26, 123 n. 327 (2000). 
Sanders, supra note 3, at 777 (citing MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL 
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Duke 
Univ. Press 1986) and Robert]. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism 
in the E,ra of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863 (1986»; 
see also Laurence H. Tribe, Contrasting Constitutional Visions: Of Real and Un-
178 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 32 
able way of expressing the idea that henceforth the Bill of Rights shall 
apply to the States.' "61 The Bill of Rights provisions are obviously priv-
ileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; thus, they are 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.62 The Privileges and 
Immunities Clause commands that no State can lessen, diminish or 
impair these rights, which include unenumerated rights under the 
Ninth Amendment.63 Recognizing the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause as the incorporation mechanism establishes credibility in the 
incorporation doctrine and undermines, if not eliminates, the troub-
ling concept of substantive due process.64 Precluding the application 
of the Ninth Amendment directly to the states would eliminate a 
Ninth Amendment only jurisprudence, rendering the Ninth Amend-
ment merely persuasive, and not a dispositive law regarding 
unenumerated rights issues. This fails to follow the text of the amend-
ment itself, leaving intact the flawed substantive due process doctrine. 
Courts would still use the Ninth Amendment as support, along with 
other portions of the Bill of Rights, to determine whether a funda-
mental right exists. Furthermore, courts would then likely follow the 
inaccurate precedent established and apply the right against the states 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
real Differences, 22 HARV. c.R.-C.L. L. REv. 95, 102 (1987) (stating that the 
substantive due process decisions "might better have been cast in terms of 
'privileges' or 'immunities' of national citizenship" under the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Michael Conant, 
Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-
House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY LJ. 785, 819 (1982) ("These privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States are found in the original 
Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, and in English constitutional protections 
of 1791 preserved by the Ninth Amendment."). 
Sanders, supra note 3, at 777 (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 166 (Black, j., 
concurring) ); see also Thomas K. Landry, Unenumerated Federal Rights: Ave-
nues for Application Against the States, 44 U. FLA. L. REv. 219, 223 (1992) 
("The Privileges or Immunities Clause would provide a simRle and direct 
textual basis for application of the Bill of Rights to the states.' ); Amar, supra 
note 59, at 124 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the 
Bill of Rights against the states). 
Sanders, supra note 3, at 777. Sanders cites Senator Jacob Howard's view 
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects fundamental guarantees 
from state intrusion to support his conclusion. Id. at 776 (citing CONGo 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866)). I agree with Sanders' conclu-
sion, however, I reject using a legislator'S view of what a constitutional 
amendment means when interpreting that amendment. See infra Part III.A 
&C. 
Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges and Immunities Clause and Re-
vising the Slaughter-House Cases without Exhuming Lochner: Individual 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REv. 1,21 (1996). Text, con-
text, history, ethical aspirations, precedent and constitutional structure sug-
gest that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was designed to make the 
Constitution a guarantee of liberty. Id. at 2 (providing a full account of the 
meaning, history, and interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause). 
Sanders, supra note 3, at 779. 
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Ninth Amendment only jurisprudence to determine whether an 
unenumerated right exists follows the Constitution's text, as does ap-
plying that unenumerated right against the states through the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This 
entirely text-based apparatus streamlines the jurisprudence through a 
credible constitutional foundation that eliminates the ability of judges 
to inaccurately alter the issue before them to reach a legal result that 
does not conform to constitutional language. 
Next, the Ninth Amendment, as a separate constitutional provision, 
must be recognized as an independent source of rights. Justice 
Goldberg denied that the "[N]inth [A]mendment constitutes an inde-
pendent source of rights."65 He concluded there is no textual basis 
for reading the Amendment that way.66 Reading the Ninth Amend-
ment as an independent source of rights does not mean that the 
Ninth Amendment creates rights. It simply recognizes unenumerated 
rights retained by the people. Accordingly, those rights must be inde-
pendent of the enumerated rights already existing in the text of the 
remainder of the Constitution. Justice Goldberg's complimentary 
view of the Ninth Amendment concluded: "[T]he Ninth Amendment 
simply lends strong support to the view that the 'liberty' protected by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the Fed-
eral Government or the States is not restricted to rights specifically 
mentioned in the first eight amendments."67 The Ninth Amendment, 
however, is the textually prescribed amendment to adjudicate whether 
or not an unenumerated right exists. Its text does not indicate, nor 
infer, that it is a complimentary doctrine to aid the Court in determin-
ing whether or not a fundamental right exists under the liberty inter-
est protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Ninth Amendment, rather, recognizes that there are funda-
mental personal rights that are protected from government abridge-
ment although they are not specifically mentioned in the 
Constitution.68 Justice Goldberg need only go that far. He appropri-
ately ended his analysis with, "in sum, I believe that the right of privacy 
in the marital relation is fundamental and basic - a personal right 're-
tained by the people' within the meaning of the Ninth Amend-
ment."69 There is no reason to curtail the reading of the Ninth 
Amendment by expanding upon that pronouncement. Allowing the 
Ninth Amendment to be the sole arbiter of unenumerated rights is-
" 
65. Mitchell, supra note 58, at 1731 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479,492 (1965)(Goldberg,j., concurring)). 
66. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1731. 
67. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, j., concurring) (citing United Public 
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,94-95 (1947) ("The right ofa citizen to act 
as a party official or worker to further his own political views ... [is con-
tained in the First, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments] ."). 
68. [d. at 496 (Goldberg, j., concurring). 
69. Id. at 499 (Goldberg, j., concurring). 
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sues is not legislating from the bench, it is the constitutional com-
mandment of its text. 
Justice Black refurbished, if not created, the textually inaccurate 
traditional approach to Ninth Amendment jurisprudence in his dis-
senting opinion, joined by Justice Stewart. 70 Justice Black concluded 
there is no right to privacy written in the Constitution and that the 
Court should stick to the simple language of amendments when con-
struing them. 71 However, he failed to heed his own warning and ig-
nored the text of the Ninth Amendment. He rejected the idea that 
judges can determine whether or not state law violates fundamental 
principles ofliberty and justice or is contrary to the people's traditions 
and collective conscience.72 He incorrectly stated that "one would ... 
have to look far beyond the language of the Ninth Amendment to find 
that the Framers vested in this Court any such awesome veto powers 
over lawmaking, either by the States or by the Congress."73 The lan-
guage of the amendment declares that the people retain unenumer-
ated rights. As Justice Black admitted, under Marbury v. Madison,14 the 
United States Supreme Court "has constitutional power to strike down 
statutes, state or federal, that violate commands of the Federal Consti-
tution."75 It is an open and shut case then. The plain meaning of the 
Ninth Amendment announces that the people retain unenumerated 
rights. The holding of Marbury sanctions the Court to strike down 
state or federal law violating a portion of the federal Constitution.76 If 
we follow the simple words of the amendment and Marbury, how can 
we not recognize that the Court has to be the arbiter of unenumerated 
rights issues? Because Justice Black had no text on which to stand, he 
used a non-textual historical analysis. He proclaimed that the purpose 
of the Ninth Amendment was to assure the people that the Constitu-
tion would limit the federal government to its expressly granted pow-
ers or those developed from necessary implication.77 If that is what 
the Ninth Amendment means, why does its text not say that or some-
thing somewhat similar? 
Justice Black suggested that allowing judges to determine 
unenumerated rights would create a "day-to-day constitutional con-
vention."78 That is inaccurate because the text of the Ninth Amend-
70. See generally id. at 507-27 (Black,]., dissenting). 
71. See id. at 508-09 (Black,]., dissenting). 
72. [d. at 518-19 (Black,]., dissenting). 
73. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 519 (Black,J., dissenting)(emphasis added). 
74. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
75. Griswold, 381 U.S at 513 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Marbury, 5 U.S. (l 
Cranch) at 177-78. 
76. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-78. 
77. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 520 (Black,]., dissenting); see also id. at 530 (Stewart,]., 
dissenting) ("[TJhe Federal Government was to be a government of express 
and limited powers, and that all rights and powers not delegated to it were 
retained by the people and the individual States."). 
78. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 520 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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ment commands that the people retain unenumerated rights; thus, 
they warrant constitutional protection from all three branches of gov-
ernment. The amendment creates a degree of uncertainty since 
rights not enumerated are protected. If a judge granted an 
unenumerated right constitutional protection without the presence of 
the Ninth Amendment in the Constitution, that would be judicial ac-
tivism. Since the text mandates that the people retain unenumerated 
rights, a judicial mechanism protecting them from unconstitutional 
infringement is constitutionally necessary. Justice Black feared that 
authorizing judges to strike down laws under the Ninth Amendment 
because they are "unreasonable, unwise, arbitrary, capricious or irra-
tional" would blur the separation of powers in government and re-
duce states' rights. 79 The Ninth Amendment's text does not allow a 
judge to strike down a law for those reasons; thus, that fear is un-
founded. The Court may only recognize an unenumerated right re-
tained by the people. 
C. The Ninth Amendment and Substantive Due Process Since Griswold 
1. Recent Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence 
Unfortunately, the textually erroneous substantive due process doc-
trine has grown much like Pinocchio's nose. However, the unsound 
nature of the doctrine has met judicial resistance. While the United 
States Supreme Court still follows the doctrine when determining 
unenumerated rights issues, it has alluded to the weak foundation and 
applicability of the doctrine, thereby leaving a window of opportunity 
for the Ninth Amendment to reenter the constitutional landscape and 
shut the door on substantive due process. 
In Roe v. Wade,80 the Court ruled that a woman has a right to pri-
vacy, including a qualified right to terminate a pregnancy, under the 
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty.81 The Court 
found the roots of the right to privacy in the text and case law of the 
First Amendment,82 the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,83 the penum-
bras of the Bill of Rights,84 the Ninth Amendment,85 and the concept 
79. 
80. 
8l. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
85. 
See id. at 52l. 
410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
[d. at 153. 
[d. at 152 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). In Stanley, 
the right of privacy protected a citizen's private possession of obscene mat-
ter from criminal culpability. 394 U.S. at 559. 
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, j., dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 621 (1886)). 
Rne, 410 U.S. at 152 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 
(1965)) . 
[d. (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, j., concurring)). 
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of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment.86 Astonishingly, that smor-
gasbord of amendments, decisions, and legal principles, from numer-
ous portions of the Constitution, made it clear to the Court that only 
personal rights considered fundamental or implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty are part of the guarantee of personal privacy.87 The 
Court's reliance on varying decisions, from separate constitutional 
provisions, to find a right of privacy shows substantive due process's 
non-textual foundation. The Court can rely on a panoply of majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions addressing different legal issues, 
to determine the scope of the right to privacy. This system allows the 
Court to reach as far and wide as needed to find support for its hold-
ing. That type of judicial stretching at least begs credibility to the 
question of whether the Court is acting as another legislature. Fur-
thermore, the Court need not, and should not, follow a judicially 
crafted yellow brick road to recognize an un enumerated right. Adju-
dicating unenumerated rights through the Ninth Amendment would 
establish standards and case law to evaluate those concerns, thereby 
strengthening the jurisprudence through specific textual and case law 
driven guidelines. Consequently, the folly of searching for an analogy 
to buttress recognition of a fundamental right becomes unnecessary. 
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,88 the Court invalidated a city hous-
ing ordinance restricting the family members available to reside in a 
dwelling to only a few categories of related individuals.89 The Court 
concluded that substantive due process protects the freedom of per-
sonal choice in matters of marriage and family life.90 The decision 
conceded that substantive due process has been a treacherous field, 
with numerous risks present when the Court grants substantive liber-
ties without the guidance of a specific portion of the Bill of Rights.91 
The Court admitted that Lochner-type decisions foster caution and re-
straint; however, it refused to abandon substantive due process.92 
This is a perfect example of the Court recognizing its substantive due 
process dilemma, while still holding true to it, instead of reverting to 
the text and meaning of the Ninth Amendment. That reversion 
would provide a specific portion of the Bill of Rights to invalidate the 
city ordinance, thereby decreasing the level of risk, caution, and re-
straint present when determining unenumerated rights issues. 
In Bowers v. Hardwick,93 the Court upheld a Georgia statute 
criminalizing homosexual sodomy.94 The decision narrowly framed 
86. Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 u.s. 390, 399 (1923)). 
87. Id. (quoting in part Palko v. Connecticut, 302 u.s. 319, 325 (1937)). 
88. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
89. Id. at 496, 499. 
90. Id. at 499. 
91. Id. at 502. 
92. Id. 
93. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
94. Id. at 189. 
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the issue, questioning whether there is a right to engage in homosex-
ual sodomy, not whether the actions were protected privacy rights.95 
The Court found the right to engage in homosexual sodomy was not a 
fundamental liberty implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or a 
liberty that was deeply rooted in the country's history and tradition.96 
The Court continued to acknowledge substantive due process's loose 
foundation by concluding: 
It is true that despite the language of the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which ap-
pears to focus only on the process by which life, liberty, or 
property is taken, the cases are legion in which those Clauses 
have been interpreted to have substantive content, sub-
suming rights that to a great extent are immune from federal 
or state regulation or proscription.97 
Once again, the Court took notice of the textual problem it faced 
when applying the substantive due process doctrine, but the Court 
continued to sanction the doctrine's use without a look to the text of 
the Ninth Amendment to solve the problem. 
In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,98 the Court upheld a California statute 
that presumes a child born to a married couple is a product of that 
relationship, thereby excluding a person outside the marriage from 
establishing paternity to the child.99 The decision reiterated the prob-
lematic nature of substantive due process,100 and focused its principles 
on (1) the interests society traditionally protectslOl that are (2) so 
rooted in the people's traditions and conscience to be ranked as fun-
damental. 102 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,103 the Court affirmed the 
core holding of Roe and retreated from the ardent historical and tradi-
tional analysis for a more flexible standard. The decision determined 
that due process has not been reduced to any formula; thus, its con-
tent cannot be determined by reference to any code.104 Also, the 
Court concluded freezing due process at some fixed stage of time or 
95. Id. at 190. The United States Supreme Court is expected to rule in Lawrence 
v. Texas, whether a Texas statute punishing homosexual sodomy is 
constitutional. 
96. Id. at 191-92 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26; Moore v. 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 497, 506 (1965). 
97. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). 
98. 491 U.S. llO (1989). 
99. See id. at 131-32. 
100. See id. at 121-22. 
101. Id. at 122. 
102. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,105 (1934)). 
103. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
lO4. Id. at 849 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (opinion dis-
senting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds). 
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thought suggests that constitutional adjudication is a function for in-
animate machines and not for judges. 105 
In Washington v. Glucksberg,106 the Court upheld a Washington law 
preventing physician-assisted suicide.107 The decision provides a re-
turn towards a more historical and traditional review of substantive 
due process, while at the same time still criticizing the doctrine itself. 
The weak and flawed substantive due process doctrine 108 is exposed: 
[T] he Court has "always been reluctant to expand the con-
cept of substantive due process because guideposts for re-
sponsible decision making in this uncharted area are scarce 
and open-ended." By extending constitutional protection to 
an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, 
place the matter outside the arena of public debate and leg-
islative action. We must therefore "exercise the utmost care 
whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field," 
lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly 
transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of 
this Court .... 
. . . We have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause 
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties 
which are, objectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history 
and tradition," and "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they 
were sacrificed." Second, we have required in substantive-
due-process cases a "careful description" of the asserted fun-
damental liberty interest. Our Nation's history, legal tradi-
tions, and practices thus provide the crucial "guideposts for 
responsible decision making," that direct and restrain our 
exposition of the Due Process Clause. 109 
Troxel v. GranvilU? 10 gave the Court another opportunity to utilize 
the Ninth Amendment. Instead it, "invoked the nonmammalian 
whale of substantive due process, a phantasmagorical beast conjured 
up by judges without clear textual warrant."111 The Court relied on 
Meyer and Pierce to conclude a Washington state statute allowing visita-
tion rights to persons other than a child's custodial parents violated a 
mother's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, 
custody, and control of her children. 112 
105. [d. at 850 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1952». 
106. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
107. [d. at 735. 
108. Niles, supra note 13, at 135. 
109. [d. at 136 (quoting Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-21 (1997) 
(citations omitted). 
110. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
111. Amar, supra note 59, at 122-23. 
112. 530 U.S. at 65-67. 
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A few weeks after Troxel, in Stenberg v. LeRoy,113 the Court had an-
other chance to right its substantive due process wrong. The Court 
began its opinion with a sentence that should have called its attention 
to the Ninth Amendment: "We again consider the right to an abor-
tion."1l4 Because an unenumerated right, abortion, was considered, 
the amendment concerning unenumerated rights, the Ninth, should 
have governed the case. Instead, the Court followed substantive due 
process precedent in Roe and Casey and determined a Nebraska statute 
criminalizing certain partial birth abortions was unconstitutional. 115 
While the standards of substantive due process continue to fluctu-
ate, a more restrictive evaluation has generally been adopted. For-
merly, the Court considered whether an asserted unenumerated 
fundamental right was "'of the very essence of a scheme of ordered 
liberty,' '>116 or was required by a "'principle of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal."'117 Now the Court considers only whether the alleged right has 
historically been protected against governmental interference. 1 IS 
Before the change, the Court inquired into traditions as if they were 
principles in which to aspire to, allowing for more development and 
progression. llg Mter the change, the Court now inquires into tradi-
tions as if they were narrowly conceived historical practices. I20 
The topsy-turvy nature of recent substantive due process methodol-
ogy seems to conform to the result needed, depending upon which 
ideological block forms a majority. It has become based on more tra-
dition and history, thereby, limiting the recognition of rights, while 
still expanding to contain more flexible and evolving principles when 
recognizing the existence of a fundamental right. These inconsistent 
analytical means undoubtedly promote the possibility of judicial legis-
lation due to substantive due process's lack of a textual origin. 
2. Recent Ninth Amendment Jurisprudence 
As you might expect, the Ninth Amendment's role in modern juris-
prudence is still largely irrelevant. A few post-Griswold cases, however, 
113. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
114. [d. at 920 (emphasis added). 
115. [d. at 929-30. Justice Scalia discussed the Ninth Amendment in his dissent. 
For analysis of his opinion see infra Part I1.C.2. 
116. Fleming. supra note 20, at 57 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S 319, 
325 (1937»; see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). 
117. Fleming. supra note 20, at 57 (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (citations 
omitted) ). 
118. [d. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986». 
119. [d. 
120. [d. 
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have mentioned the Ninth Amendment. 121 Justice Douglas is largely 
responsible for post-Griswold Ninth Amendment jurisprudence and 
has become a pseudo-pioneer of recognizing Ninth Amendment 
rights. In Palmer v. Thompson,122 the Court upheld a city's decision to 
close racially segregated swimming pools, rather than keeping them 
open and integrated. 123 Justice Douglas opined: 
My conclusion is that the Ninth Amendment has a bearing 
on the present problem. 
The "rights" retained by the people within the meaning of 
the Ninth Amendment may be related to those "rights" 
which are enumerated in the Constitution. 
There is, of course, not a word in the Constitution, unlike 
many modern constitutions, concerning the right of the peo-
ple . . . to recreation by swimming or otherwise. Those 
rights, like the right to pure air and pure water, may well be 
rights "retained by the people" under the Ninth Amend-
ment. May the people vote them down as well as Up?124 
In Doe v. Bolton,125 Justice Douglas concluded that Ninth Amend-
ment rights include customary, traditional, and time honored rights, 
amenities, privileges, and immunities that come within the "the Bless-
ings of Liberty" mentioned in the Constitution's preamble. 126 He 
blends his Ninth Amendment jurisprudence with substantive due pro-
cess by adding that many Ninth Amendment rights are within the 
meaning of "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment. 127 In Lubin v. 
Parrish, 128 Justice Douglas announced that "the right to vote in state 
121. 
122. 
123. 
124. 
125. 
126. 
127. 
128. 
See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,210 (1975) (Douglas,]., concurring); Lubin 
v. Parrish, 415 U.S. 709, 721 n.* (1974) (Douglas,]., concurring); Palmerv. 
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233 (1971) (Douglas,]., dissenting). 
403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
[d. at 219. 
[d. at 233-34 (Douglas,]., dissenting); see also Osborn v. United States, 385 
U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas,]., dissenting) (quoting Griswold's mention 
of the Ninth Amendment as a source for the right of privacy); Olff v. E. 
Side Union High Sch. Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971), em. denied, 404 
U.S. 1042, 1043 (1972) (Douglas,]., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(noting that a school student's hair style is a fundamental right retained 
under the Ninth Amendment); Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (lath Cir. 
1971), em. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972) (Douglas,]., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari) (dissenting for the same reasons as stated in the Olffdissent.). 
410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
[d. at 210 (Douglas,]., concurring); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 
665, 714 (1972) (Douglas,]., dissenting) (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn, 
The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 254 ("The Second 
through the Ninth Amendments limit the powers ... in order that due 
regard shall be paid to the private 'rights of the governed.''')). 
Doe, 410 U.S. at 210-11 (Douglas,]., concurring). 
415 U.S. 709 (1974). 
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elections is one of the rights ... 'retained by the people' by virtue of 
the Ninth Amendment as well as included in the penumbra of First 
Amendment rights."129 
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,130 the Court used the Ninth 
Amendment to support the finding that the First Amendment con-
tains a right of the press to attend criminal trials. 131 The Court's so-
journ into the Ninth Amendment is largely irrelevant because the 
amendment was inappropriately used as a rule of construction, rather 
than an explicit guarantee of the right. 132 This approach is similar to 
the Griswold majority's curt mention of the Ninth Amendment as sup-
port for its finding of a right to privacy applied through the substan-
tive due process doctrine. 133 
As discussed above, Troxel concluded a Washington state statute al-
lowing visitation rights to persons other than a child's biological par-
ents violated the biological mother's fundamental right to bring up 
her children under a substantive due process methodology.134 Justice 
Scalia's dissent concluded the right of parents to direct the upbring-
ing of their children was an unalienable right proclaimed in the Dec-
laration of Independence and an unenumerated right under the 
Ninth Amendment.135 Unfortunately, Justice Scalia dropped the ball 
by concluding that the Constitution did not entitle him to deny legal 
effect to laws he views infringe upon what he considers an unenumer-
ated right. 136 However, the Constitution provides "the supreme Law 
of the Land"137 and Justice Scalia is "bound by Oath or Affirma-
tion"138 to support the Constitution; thus, he must uphold and apply 
the Ninth Amendment. To determine that an unenumerated right 
exists that cannot be abridged, and then to allow a legislature to 
abridge that right, nullifies the right and places the legislature above a 
co-equal branch of government, the judiciary. 139 
129. [d. at 721 n.*. 
130. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
131. [d. at 579-80; see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citing 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-96 (1965) (Goldberg,]., concur-
ring) ("The integrity of the family unit has found protection in [the Ninth 
Amendment] ."). 
132. See Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1732. 
133. See id. at 1732-33. 
134. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
135. [d. at 91 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
136. [d. at 92. 
137. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
138. [d. 
139. For two other non-substantive due process views on Troxel see Amar, supra 
note 59, at 123 (pointing out that Justice Scalia ignores the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause as constitutional text limiting state power to restrict un-
specified, fundamental freedoms); Troxe~ 530 U.S. at 80 n. * (Thomas,]., 
concurring) (declining to reevaluate whether substantive due process cases 
contradict the original understanding of the Due Process Clause and 
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Troxel's cursory discussion of the Ninth Amendment, along with 
Stenberg not mentioning it a few weeks later, left Ninth Amendment 
jurisprudence essentially where it has been for a while. The Court 
does not use the Ninth Amendment as a tool for incorporating inde-
pendent unenumerated rights or as an independent source of rights; 
instead, the Ninth Amendment incorporates certain rights -
unenumerated but related to those enumerated - into the Bill of 
Rights. 140 These incorporated rights are then applied against the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 141 
D. The Elimination of Substantive Due Process Law 
Regardless of what interpretative school of thought a legal scholar is 
in, there should be little debate that the creation of "substantive due 
process" in the Fourteenth Amendment is a judicial leap. How can 
due process have a substantive element? The Constitution provides no 
textual basis for substantive due process. 142 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment states that "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process oflaw."143 The amendment does not 
contain the word "substantive" before the words "due process." As 
John Hart Ely noted, "'there is simply no avoiding the fact that the 
word that follows 'due' is 'process.' [W]e apparently need periodic 
reminding that 'substantive due process' is a contradiction in terms 
sort of like 'green pastel redness.' "144 Substantive due process is a 
paradoxical, oxymoronic phrase that "'has been inflated into a 
patched and leaky tire on which precariously rides the load of some 
substantive human rights not named in the Constitution.' "145 Due 
process simply requires that the substance of any law be applied to a 
person through fair procedures by any tribunal hearing the case.146 
The clause does not say anything about what the substance of the law 
must be. 147 The meaning of the Due Process Clause's words, and their 
natural implications, do not guarantee substantive rights. 148 Due pro-
cess prevents the government from doing certain things to people 
whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause is incorrectly interpreted be-
cause those issues were not argued). 
140. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1731. 
141. Id. 
142. Niles, supra note 13, at 91 (citing CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF 
FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED 3 (Penguin Putnam Books 
1997)). 
143. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
144. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 34-
41 (1980). 
145. Niles, supra note 13, at 136 n.162 (quoting BLACK, supra note 142, at 3). 
146. Bruce N. Morton, John Locke, Robert Bark, Natural Rights and the Interpretation 
of the Constitution, 22 SETON HALL L. REv. 709,756 (1992) (quoting BORK, 
supra note 15, at 31). 
147. Id. 
148. Niles, supra note 13, at 91 n.20 (citing BLACK, supra note 142, at 3). 
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without fair procedures.149 The clause does not state what things may 
or may not be done. lso For example, the Due Process Clause prevents 
a person from being tried before a bribed judge, or from being tried 
without being informed of the charge against them. ISI It could not 
prevent an unbribed tribunal from convicting a defendant in a proce-
durally fair trial for marrying at age thirty-nine under a state statute 
setting the minimum age to marry at forty. 152 Changing due process 
from a procedural protection to a quality being protected is not a 
small step, but one giant leap for judge-kind. By applying substantive 
due process, "[t]he Court has attempted to fit square pegs into round 
holes, by forcing rights that might properly be protected by the broad 
. language of the [N]inth [A]mendment into constitutional provisions 
where no amount of pushing can comfortably make them fit."153 
Therefore, the lack of textual support for fundamental rights pro-
tected under substantive due process, and the corresponding reliance 
on tradition and fundamentality to restrict the doctrine, result in a 
weak and unsatisfactory mechanism for the protection of personal 
freedom. 154 Marc C. Niles adopted Charles L. Black, Jr.'s view con-
cerning substantive due process's deficiencies by stating: 
[The application of substantive due process] follows no 
sound methods of interpretation (how could it, given the na-
ture of the phrase itself?) and is therefore neither reliably 
invocable in cases that come up, nor forecastable in result by 
anything much but a guess. This kind of non-standard is not 
good enough for a systematic equity of human rights. It 
everlastingly will not do; it is infra dignitatem, it leaks in the 
front and leaks in the back.155 
The substantive due process doctrine's lack of textual constitutional 
support persuades judges to limit the scope of rights granted under it. 
Conservative jurists ascribed to this ironic rights-limiting view of the 
rights-expanding substantive due process doctrine as a mechanism 
for identifying and protecting only those rights or liberties that have a 
149. Morton, supra note 146, at 756 (quoting BaRK, supra note 15, at 180). 
150. Id. 
151. Niles, supra note 13, at 91 n.20 (quoting BLACK, supra note 142, at 2). 
152. Id. (quoting BLACK, supra note 142, at 2-3). 
153. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1727; see also Jason S. Marks, Beyond Penumbras 
and Emanations: Fundamental Rights, The Spirit of the Revolution, and the Ninth 
Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CaNST. LJ. 435, 482 (1995) (noting that the 
Ninth Amendment appears to be a stronger textual basis than the Four-
teenth Amendment for unenumerated rights.). 
154. Niles, supra note 13, at 137; see also Derrick Alexander Pope, A Constitutional 
Window to Interpretive Reason: or in Other Words . .. The Ninth Amendment, 37 
How. LJ. 441, 458 (1994) ("[A]ny reliance upon the Due Process Clause to 
identify substantive rights is ill-advised."). 
155. Niles, supra note 13, at 91 n.19 (quoting BLACK, supra note 142, at 3). 
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firm foundation in the murky legal, historical, moral or ethical tradi-
tion of Britain or the United States. 156 
The need to find some form of judicial restraint causes the Court to 
rely on "'tradition to decide whether a right deserves protection 
under the Due Process Clause."'157 The need for some restraint on 
substantive due process - necessary because of the doctrine's lack of a 
textual foundation that would otherwise provide an effective limita-
tion - results in its great failure as a mechanism to protect individual 
privacy rights and check illegitimate government power. 158 This re-
striction identifies a limited sphere of personal autonomy primarily 
because it requires individuals to demonstrate that what they intend 
to do is so fundamental and sacrosanct in the English speaking 
world's history that any government attempt to regulate the activity 
should be closely scrutinized. 159 
When the Court defines fundamental liberties that are not men-
tioned in the Constitution, it must act with more caution or become 
susceptible to criticism that it is imposing its own controversial choices 
of value upon the people.160 If the Court were to determine 
unenumerated rights under the Ninth Amendment, as opposed to 
fundamental liberties through substantive due process's ever chang-
ing sources, a textual foundation would be laid in this area of jurispru-
dence decreasing judicial caution and public criticism because the 
judiciary would be acting under constitutionally prescribed authority 
instead of whimsical notions of judicial creativity.161 
III. THE MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 
A. The Ninth Amendment's Text 
It is well known that "[t]he interpretation of any written law must 
begin with its text."162 A Constitutional analysis begins with the "con-
stitutional text speaking to ... [the] precise question."163 Accordingly, 
"[ t] he text itself is an obvious starting point of legal analysis. Is it even 
156. 
157. 
158. 
159. 
160. 
161. 
162. 
163. 
[d. at 138 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. at 293-94 
(Scalia,]., concurring». 
[d. at 139 (quoting Anthony C. Cicia, Note, A Wolf in Sheep'S Clothing?: A 
Critical Analysis of justice Harlan's Substantive Due Process Formulation, 64 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 2241, 2246 (1996». 
[d. at 140. 
[d. 
Tribe, supra note 60, at 105 (citing Thornburgh v. Am. Coil. of Obstetri-
cians, 476 U.S 747, 790 (1986) (White,]., dissenting». 
See also Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1727 ("The decisions the Court's critics 
find most objectionable might be more textually defensible if premised 
frankly on the principle embodied in the [N] inth [A] mendment - that the 
scop~ of the Constitution in protecting individual rights is broader than its 
text. ). 
[d. at 1721; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI (stating that the Constitution is the 
supreme law of the land). 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997). 
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possible to deduce the spirit of a law without looking at its letter?"164 
Therefore, a reading of the Ninth Amendment is the first step in revi-
talizing it. The Ninth Amendment states, "[t]he enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people."165 As one commentator noted: 
It seems clear from the language of the [N]inth 
[A]mendment that certain rights exist even though they are 
not enumerated in the Constitution, that these rights are re-
tained by the people, and that by express command these 
unenumerated rights are not to be denied or disparaged by 
any governmental body. It is also a generally accepted tru-
ism that "[i] t cannot be presumed that any clause in the 
[C]onstitution is intended to be without effect .... " " ... [A]s 
no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference, so none 
should suffer subordination or deletion."166 
164. Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 66 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 
1143, 1143 (1998). 
165. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
166. Jordan]. Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form ofGuar-
antee, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 231, 237 (1975); see also Barnett, infra note 182, at 
3, 42 (noting that the Ninth Amendment protects unenumerated rights 
retained by the people); Bitensky, supra note 7, at 623 (noting that straight-
forward reading of Ninth Amendment means that the enumeration of 
rights in the Constitution must not be interpreted to preclude future recog-
nition of unenumerated rights in the Constitution); David M. Burke, The 
"Presumption of Constitutionality" Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court: A Lethal 
Combination for Individual Liberty, 18 HARv.].L. & PUB.POL'y 73, 128 (1994) 
("The Ninth Amendment['s] [language] commands that the enumeration 
of the rights in the first eight Amendments 'shall not be construed to deny 
or disparage' those rights, too numerous to describe specifically, 'retained' 
by the people."); Phoebe A. Haddon, An Essay on the Ninth Amendment: Inter-
pretation for the New World Order, 2 TEMP. POL. & ClY. RTS. L. REv. 93, 93 
(1992) ("The text, on its face seems to support the argument that the rights 
protected by the Constitution are not limited to its express provisions."); 
Stephen D. Hampton, Sleeping Giant: The Ninth Amendment and Criminal 
Law, 20 Sw. U. L. REv. 349, 349 (1991) ("[T]he Ninth Amendment estab-
lishes United States citizens have unenumerated rights, rights not listed in 
the Constitution."); Douglas Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory 
of Judicial Review, 59 TEX. L. REv. 343, 368 (1981) (noting that the Ninth 
Amendment's text recognizes unenumerated rights); Calvin R. Massey, Fed-
eralism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 305, 
343 (1987) (noting that the Ninth Amendment preserves "fundamental 
rights that were not enumerated in the first eight amendments or else-
where in the Constitution"); Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1742 ("[T]he Ninth 
Amendment commands broad incorporation of the individual rights that 
the Constitution was intended to protect."); Randall R. Murphy, The Fram-
ers' Evolutionary Perception of Rights: Using International Human Rights Norms as 
a Source for Discovery of Ninth Amendment Rights, 21 STETSON L. REv. 423, 447 
(1992) (noting that the meaning of the Ninth Amendment's words "seems 
to be that not all rights retained are enumerated in the Constitution"); 
Pope, supra note 154, at 450 ("The Ninth Amendment recognizes that, in 
the realm of human existence and development, there are potentially more 
rights and privileges than the Constitution can bear to enumerate."); Sager, 
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This straightforward interpretation of the Ninth Amendment has 
the distinct virtue of construing the amendment's words for just what 
they seem to say.167 The Ninth Amendment's message, "as plain as 
one might hope for given the vagaries of language, that the specifica-
tion of some rights was not to be interpreted as denying the equal 
presence within the legal system of other, enumerated rights."168 
Even if the Ninth Amendment's language is considered vague, '" [i] tis 
rare ... that even the most vague and general text cannot be given 
some precise, principled content - and that is indeed the essence of 
the judicial craft.' "169 
The Ninth Amendment prescribes that there are unenumerated 
rights retained by the people and a reading of other constitutional 
rights cannot be used to deny or even disparage the unenumerated 
rights retained by the people.170 The amendment, at first glance, ap-
pears to be a failsafe. In case a right retained by the people was not 
enumerated, that does not preclude the recognition of that right. 
Originalist judges and scholars, supposedly committed to an origi-
nal understanding of the Ninth Amendment, skip the text of it and 
jump to the secondary components of legal analysis to find their an-
swer.17I These sources include historical understanding and practice, 
the Constitution's structure, and the jurisprudence of the United 
States Supreme Court. 172 These sources are only invoked to answer a 
constitutional question when there is "no constitutional text speaking 
to [the] precise question."173 However, originalists, who advocate 
strict adherence to the explicit language of the Constitution and con-
demn the judicial practice of protecting privacy rights that have no 
167. 
168. 
169. 
170. 
171. 
172. 
173. 
supra note 56, at 242 (noting that unenumerated rights, not explicitly mani-
fest in liberty-bearing provisions of the Constitution, enjoy the same status 
as those made explicit in the text.); Sanders, supra note 3, at 761 (noting 
that the text of the Ninth Amendment contemplates unenumerated rights 
besides those specifically listed elsewhere); Sol Wachtler, Judging the Ninth 
Amendment, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 597, 617 (1991) (noting that the Ninth 
Amendment was adopted to ensure unenumerated rights would be pro-
tected). Compare with Sotirios A. Barber, The Ninth Amendment: Inkblot or An-
other Hard Nut to Crack? 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 67, 79 (1988) (stating that a 
liberal reading of the Ninth Amendment recognizing unenumerated rights 
suggests the Constitution's openness to justice). But see Michael McCon-
nell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 
89,109 (1988) ("Open-ended judicial review-the doctrine of un enumerated 
rights-threatens to cut short the very process of 'open-minded and public-
spirited' deliberation upon which moral realism depends."). 
Bitensky, supra note 7, at 623. 
Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 131, 141 (1988). 
Burke, supra note 166, at 123 (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a 
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1183 (1989». 
Morton, supra note 146, at 751. 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997). 
Id. 
Id. 
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specific textual basis,174 do not follow the text of the Ninth Amend-
ment. Robert Bork proposed this alleged originalist view. 175 He 
argued: 
I do not think you can use the Ninth Amendment unless you 
know something of what it means. For example, if you had 
an amendment that says "Congress shall make no" and then 
there is an inkblot, and you cannot read the rest of it, and 
that is the only copy you have, I do not think the Court can 
make up what might be under the inkblot.176 
Bork believes that when "original understanding is lost, or cannot 
be established with sufficient confidence," judges should refrain from 
working because there is nothing to work with.177 Unfortunately for 
Bork, "[ t] here is no inkblot after the words 'The enumeration in the 
Constitution.' We have the full text of the sentence."178 This is a per-
fect example of the non-original originalist argument against recog-
nizing that the Ninth Amendment grants the people rights not 
enumerated in the Constitution. When compared with some of the 
language and punctuation of the rest of the Constitution, the Ninth 
Amendment is a rather straightforward and clear pronouncement. 
To deny that its original meaning grants the people unenumerated 
rights is not an originalist position. 
The Ninth Amendment's meaning cannot be compromised by pe-
ripheral legal arguments. While a strong smoke screen can be estab-
lished through these positions, one need look no further then the text 
of the amendment to dissipate the cloud of smoke. A brief reading of 
the amendment leads to a simple and obvious conclusion - individu-
als retain unenumerated rights outside the enumerated rights in the 
Constitution. Unless the Ninth Amendment is repealed or altered 
through a constitutional amendment, courts have a duty to give full 
effect to its terms. 179 
Originalists, critics of a Ninth Amendment jurisprudence authoriz-
ing the recognition of unenumerated rights, "ignore the implications 
of the ... amendment and thus depart from their own stated commit-
174. Geoffrey G. Slaughter, The Ninth Amendment's Role in the Evolution of Funda-
mental Rightsjurisprudence, 64 IND. LJ. 97, 98 (1988). 
175. See Sanders, supra note 3, at 791. 
176. Sanders, supra note 3, at 791 (quoting Robert H. Bork, The BorkDisinjvrmers, 
WALL ST.]., Oct. 5,1987, at 22). 
177. Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government's Power to Enact Color-Conscious 
Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 477, 535-36 (1998) (citing 
BaRK, supra note 15, at 166). 
178. Sanders, supra note 3, at 791. 
179. Burke, supra note 166, at 122. The Constitution, including the Ninth 
Amendment, may be amended. See U.S. CaNST. art. V. Until that occurs, 
federal judges are bound by oath or affirmation to uphold the Ninth 
Amendment. U.S. CaNST. art. VI. 
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ment to constitutional text and original intent."180 Because the Ninth 
Amendment was intended to point toward enforceable fundamental 
rights that exist apart from the text, originalists who deny these rights 
exist have to resort to a non-originalist foundation for their constitu-
tional theory. 181 When originalists abandon their methodology only 
when considering the Ninth Amendment, they may reach their de-
sired result of greatly limiting the scope of constitutional rights, but 
only at the price of maintaining a consistent originalist methodol-
ogy.182 The Ninth Amendment's plain meaning is an embarrassment 
to originalists and their political agenda. 183 Originalists are "com-
pelled . . . to assert that the amendment does not mean what it 
says .... "184 Therefore, originalists like Bork are left to make person-
ally held philosophical and policy based arguments, instead of follow-
ing the language and history of the Constitution.185 Ultimately, the 
Ninth Amendment's existence serves as proof that originalists fatally 
misread the Bill of Rights' purpose and role. 186 
The Ninth Amendment provides the appropriate balance between 
complying with the Constitution's text and providing an evolving form 
of jurisprudence. Texts limit, even if they do not precisely define, the 
interpretations that can be reasonably offered for them and the legal 
fictions that they can generate. 187 The Ninth Amendment acknowl-
edges these restrictive problems and suggests that the Constitution is 
capable of adapting to societal change.188 We must remember, how-
ever, that the power of the Ninth Amendment to evolve through inter-
pretation is granted from its text.189 This concept seems illogical in 
some legal circles. Generally, textualists rely "on a fixed view of the 
meaning of a law based on how it was believed to have been inter-
preted at the time of its adoption."19o This stance overly restricts legal 
thought and analytical growth by positing that'" [t] he text of the doc-
ument and the original intention of those who framed it would be the 
judicial standard in giving effect to the Constitution."'1 91 Liberals ar-
gue for analytical development, but do so without pointing to a tex-
180. Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 
COLUM. L. REv. 1215, 1215 (1990) (citing Levinson, supra note 168, at 134-
35). 
181. Id. 
182. Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 
32 (1988). 
183. Morton, supra note 146, at 751. 
184. Id. at 751. 
185. Wachtler, supra note 166, at 608. 
186. Id. at 609. 
187. Tejshree Thapa, Expounding the Constitution: Legal Fictions and the Ninth 
Amendment, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 139, 141 (1992). 
188. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1723. 
189. Thapa, supra note 187, at 161. 
190. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1724. 
191. Id. at 1723 n.24 (quoting Attorney General Edwin Meese, III, before the 
American Bar Association Uuly 9, 1985». 
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tual foundation to support their premise. That position 
inappropriately obviates the text by concluding that following the 
Constitution's words leads to simple, myopic, inhibiting references to 
an enacted law's words. '92 This position believes the Constitution's 
broadly drafted clauses demonstrate the impossibility of textualism; 
thus, it follows that courts should apply the principles embodied in 
these phrases. '93 Similarly, this view proclaims no language is copious 
enough to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so 
correct as to exclude many equivocally denoting different ideas. '94 
Therefore, differing views surrounding the vision of the Ninth 
Amendment are each incomplete. The Ninth Amendment specifi-
cally authorizes constitutional evolution because its text provides that 
the people retain unenumerated rights. Because the text of the 
amendment issues this commandment, analytical development is a 
text-based function of Ninth Amendment jurisprudence. It is, in a 
sense, the best of both worlds. The meaning of the words of the 
amendment at issue are applied and adhered to, and the flexibility of 
the amendment to apply to current legal disputes is sanctioned. 
B. The Judiciary's Role in Ninth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The application of the Ninth Amendment to evaluate unenumer-
ated rights claims is not judicial activism; conversely, it is judicial activ-
ism not to apply the Ninth Amendment.195 Judges are responsible for 
adjudicating competing claims of right between governments and in-
dividuals. '96 The Declaration of Independence expressed the expec-
tation that all government bodies, including the members of the 
judiciary, were to secure rights that were fundamental to all. 197 The 
judiciary's action or inaction will directly affect the realization of fun-
damental human expectations. 198 The Ninth Amendment's 
unenumerated, judicially unenforceable constitutional rights com-
192. Id. at 1724 (quoting ELY, supra note 144, at 34-41). 
193. Id. at 1721 n.15. 
194. Id. at 1721 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clin-
ton Rossiter ed., 1961». 
195. Id. at 1723. "UJudicial restraint is but another form of judicial activism." Id. 
at 1719 (quoting LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw iv 
(1978». "By inference the language .of the Ninth Amendment also invites 
the view that judges are authorized to protect rights that are not enumer-
ated as well as ones that are enumerated." Haddon, supra note 166, at 93 
(citing Barnett, supra note 182); Massey, supra note 166, at 312-13). Ste-
phen Macedo argues that the Ninth Amendment calls upon judges to en-
gage in principled judicial activism based upon sound moral thinking and 
our political tradition. Charles J. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual 
Liberty: The Ninth Amendment's Forgotten Lessons, 4 J.L. & POL. 63,65 (1987) 
(citing STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT v. THE CONSTITUTION 43 (The 
Cato Institute 1986». 
196. Morton, supra note 146, at 752. 
197. Paust, supra note 166, at 235. 
198. Id. at 235. 
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mand the respect of governmental actors whose conduct could trans-
gress them, and in the absence of judicial enforcement, those actors 
would still be obliged to determine and respect these rights. 199 
Bork argues that if judges were to determine unenumerated rights 
issues, then the Founders would have placed that in the Ninth 
Amendment's text. 200 Specifically, Bork concludes: 
[I] t is inconceivable that men who viewed the judiciary as a 
relatively insignificant branch could have devised, without 
even discussing the matter, a system, known nowhere else on 
earth, under which judges were given uncontrolled power to 
override the decisions of the democratic branches by finding 
authority outside the written Constitution.201 
That statement is textually inaccurate. The authority to override 
the legislative and executive branches is found in the text of the Ninth 
Amendment. The Ninth Amendment grants the people unenumer-
ated rights. If the legislative and executive branches unconstitution-
ally abridge an unenumerated right, the judiciary has a duty to rule 
the law unconstitutional. This form of power is controlled by what 
unenumerated rights the people retain. A judge, following the letter 
of the Ninth Amendment, can only recognize an unenumerated right 
that the people have already retained. The judiciary cannot avoid its 
responsibility for policy serving decision-making by simplistic notions 
of noninvolvement, nor can it continue to ignore several rights of 
mankind with a self-deceiving claim of unfamiliarity with fundamental 
and continuous expectations that were not specifically enumerated 
over 200 years ago. 202 
Bork believes that if judges were to be given authority to determine 
what rights the people retain, the Ninth Amendment would have said 
199. 
200. 
201. 
202. 
Sager, supra note 56, at 252. 
Allen, supra note 6, at 1662 (citing BORK, supra note 15, at 183); see also 
Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, as Perceived by Randy Barnett, 88 Nw. U. 
L. REv. 1508, 1517-18 (1994) (Allowing the judiciary to enforce unenumer-
ated rights could inappropriately enlarge judicial power and discretion); 
Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism: 
Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of "Unwritten" Individual 
Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REv. 421 (1991) (noting that the Founders did not in-
tend judges to declare legislation unconstitutional based on unwritten nat-
ural law and it is unclear whether they intended judges to declare 
legislation unconstitutional to protect rights enumerated in the 
Constitution) . 
Wachtler, supra note 166, at 607 (quoting BaRK, supra note 15, at 185); see 
also Thomas B. McAffee, Federalism and the Protection of Rights: The Modern 
Ninth Amendment's Spreading Confusion, 2 BYU L. REv. 351, 388 (1996) (stat-
ing that the Founders did not think it was acceptable for the judiciary to 
recognize unenumerated rights). 
Paust, supra note 166, at 235. An example of the judiciary's unfamiliarity 
argument is Justice Jackson's statement that Ninth Amendment rights "are 
still a mystery to me." Id. at 235 n.l4 (quoting ROBERT JACKSON, THE Su-
PREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 75 (1955)). 
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as much.203 He argues that the amendment could have been drafted 
stating: "The courts shall determine what rights, in addition to those 
enumerated here, are retained by the people," or "The American peo-
ple ... delegate to their courts the task of determining what rights, 
other than those enumerated here, are retained by the people."204 
Does the text of the First Amendment state that the judiciary should 
determine what is protected speech? Does the text of the Fourth 
Amendment state that the judiciary should determine what is a consti-
tutional search and seizure? Does the text of the Fifth Amendment 
state that the judiciary should determine if due process of law has 
been violated? Those rhetorical questions go on and on. In an eso-
teric sense, we can take constitutional interpretive questions to min-
dless settings. Someone could go as far as to say that the Con~titution 
does not state that we should read it in order or from left to right. 
How do we know how to read it then? In other words, common sense 
has to enter the equation at some point. Here, common sense indi-
cates that judicial enforcement is a necessary concomitant of a mean-
ingful right, not an extra governmental power.205 In the end, "the 
rightness of judicial review for enumerated rights settles the issue of 
the rightness of judicial review for unenumerated ones, because any-
thing else would 'disparage' these latter rights."206 
The legislative and executive branches have a role in unenumerated 
rights issues. Legislatures generally can grant additional rights 
through constitutional amendments, and the executive can enforce 
them. However, that does not preclude a situation wherein a legisla-
ture passes a law unconstitutionally restricting an unenumerated 
right, an executive signs it, and the court finds that the law is unconsti-
tutional because it violates an unenumerated right under the Ninth 
Amendment. When a violation of a vested right occurs, there exists a 
legal remedy.207 A judicial review to determine if a law violates an 
unenumerated right conveys legitimacy on legislation and, thus, legiti-
macy on the Constitution.208 Critics of judges evaluating Ninth 
203. BORK, supra note 15, at 183. 
204. Id. 
205. Sanders, supra note 3, at 793; see e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwrit-
ten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1169 (1987) (stating that legal 
remedies exist for violations of rights). 
206. Haddon, supra note 166, at 109 (citing Randy E. Barnett, FareUJard: 
Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and the Rule of Law, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'y 615,630-35,641-42 (1991)). 
207. Jack Alan Levy, As Between Princz and King: Reassessing the Law of Fareign Sover-
eign Immunity as Applied to Jus Cogens Violatars, 86 GEO. LJ. 2703, 2728 
(1998) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,162-63 (1803)) 
(stating that the right of individuals to claim protection of the laws when 
she is injured is a primary duty of government); see also Virginia Coupon 
Cases, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884) (noting that taking away the remedy en-
forcing a right "is to take away the right itself'). 
208. Randy E. Barnett, FareUJard: The Ninth Amendment and Constitutional Legiti-
macy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 37, 64 (1988). 
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Amendment issues must realize that judges are supposed to judge -
and that is constitutional. 
Bork correctly notes that the Ninth Amendment is not a warrant for 
judges to create constitutional rights not mentioned in the Constitu-
tion.209 If a judge determines that an unenumerated right exists, how-
ever, that does not mean that she created a right. 210 Natural rights 
exist independently of any form of government; thus, neither judges 
nor anyone else can create them.211 The text of the Ninth Amend-
ment, legal materials, and traditions of debate all discipline and tem-
per judges' moral judgments concerning justice and liberties.212 
Judges interpreting un enumerated rights issues will be "morally in-
formed critics of the constitutional order, working within the limits of 
fidelity to legal materials and professional norms to make their polity 
the best it can be."213 Judges should look to the Constitution, as well 
as natural law and the inherent rights of mankind, when determining 
the validity of a statute.214 Therefore, the judiciary cannot make a 
blind pronouncement that an unenumerated right exists. That would 
constitute the creation of an unenumerated right and could only be 
constitutional if the Ninth Amendment said something like, in Bork's 
words, "The courts shall create new rights as required by the princi-
ples of the republican form of government."215 In an unenumerated 
right capacity, however, the judiciary acts when a valid legal issue is 
brought before them. If they determine that a law violates an 
unenumerated right, then that recognizes the existence of the 
unenumerated right, it does not create one. It must have already ex-
isted for it to be protected by a Court evaluating the action or behav-
ior in question at some later date. 
If the judiciary does not determine unenumerated rights, then who 
does? Congress was not granted the power to evaluate unenumerated 
rights issues.216 If only congressional self-restraint checked such a 
power, then that would violate separation of powers and permit Con-
209. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
LJ. 1, 3 (1971). 
210. Morton, supra note 146, at 752. 
211. Id. 
212. Stephen Macedo, Morality and the Constitution: Toward A Synthesis for "Earth-
bound" Interpreters, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 29, 40 (1992). 
213. Id. at 41. 
214. Wachtler, supra note 166, at 611 (quoting Sherry, supra note 205, at 1145). 
215. BORK, supra note 15, at 183. Justice Scalia also misconstrues a Ninth 
Amendment jurisprudence sanctioning judges to recognize unenumerated 
rights as a proposal for judges to create rights. ANTON IN SCALIA, A MAlTER 
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 38 (Princeton Univ. 
Press 1997). 
216. Allen, supra note 6, at 1661-62. The Constitution also prohibits Congress 
and the States from passing bills of attainder. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, d. 3; 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, d. 1. Bills of attainder are legislative acts "prescrib-
ing capital punishment, without a trial, for a person guilty of a high offense 
such as treason or a felony." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 159 (7th ed. 1999). 
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gress "to become [its own] 'constitutional judge."'217 The Ninth 
Amendment's historical context was not designed to grant Congress 
authority to create additional rights.218 That power did not come, if 
ever, until Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.219 
Nor is the Ninth Amendment's reference to other rights retained by 
the people an apt way of stating that Congress may create unenumer-
ated rights.220 
State governments cannot protect a federal constitutional guaran-
tee through statutes, common law, or state constitutionallaw.221 This 
leads us back to a very basic premise - the federal judiciary has the 
power to determine if a law violates an unenumerated right protected 
by the Ninth Amendment of the federal Constitution. For judges to 
ignore it would be a violation of the Founders' express intent an-
nounced through the words of the Amendment.222 
C. James Madison's Irrelevant Intent 
James Madison is generally considered the sole author of the Ninth 
Amendment.223 Therefore, there is a scholarly temptation to deter-
mine what his vision was of the Ninth Amendment. Logically since 
the amendment is the work of Madison, his explanation of its intent 
and meaning should contro1.224 
However, any analysis of what legislators, even Madison, intended 
the Ninth Amendment to mean is irrelevant to my position.225 
Whether the Constitution or a statute is interpreted, the original 
meaning of the text is analyzed, and" 'not what the original draftsmen 
intended.' "226 The law is what the law says; thus, we should be con-
217. 
218. 
219. 
220. 
221. 
222. 
223. 
224. 
225. 
226. 
This prohibition supports the constitutional ideal that the judiciary, not the 
legislature, should adjudicate legal claims. 
Burke, supra note 166, at 125 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961». 
Allen, supra note 6, at 1662 (quoting ELY, supra note 144, at 37). "[T]here 
is nothing about elected nonjudicial officials that qualifies them specially 
to respond to the rights referenced by the [N]inth [A]mendment." Sager, 
supra note 56, at 252 (referencing Laurence G. Sager, Rights Skepticism and 
Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 417, 43641 (1981». 
Allen, supra note 6, at 1662. 
Id. 
Id. at 1662 (citing ELY, supra note 144, at 37). 
See Levinson, supra note 168, at 142. For Bork to state that "the set of en-
forceable constitutional rights is limited to those specified in text is ... to 
defy the [N]inth [A]mendment by denying that there are other rights re-
tained by the people and by disparaging the enterprise of searching for a 
mode of analysis that might flesh out this admittedly otheIWise skeletal re-
mainder." Id. 
Niles, supra note 13, at 117. 
Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1721 n.16 (citing BENNETT PATTERSON, THE FOR-
GOTTEN N1NTH AMENDMENT 18 (Bobbs-Merill 1955». 
See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (Scalia,j., concurring). 
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Founh Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 
547,740 n.555 (1999) (quoting SCALIA, supra note 215 at 38). 
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tent with reading the law rather than psychoanalyzing its enactors.227 
The text is the key, therefore, we should ignore drafting history with-
out discussing it, instead of after discussing it.228 The views of Alexan-
der Hamilton, a draftsperson, bear no more authority than the views 
of Thomas Jefferson, not a draftsperson, with regard to the meaning 
of the Constitution.229 The thoughts of a draftsperson regarding what 
rule he or she drafted meant does not change the meaning the rule 
would otherwise bear.230 Therefore, the views of James Madison 
should bear no more authority than the views of anyone else associ-
ated with the drafting and ratifying of the Ninth Amendment. 
Besides the fact that Madison's interpretation of the Ninth Amend-
ment bears no authoritative weight, scholars come to conflicting con-
clusions regarding what he intended the Ninth Amendment to 
mean.231 Thus, even if Madison's views on the meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment were relevant, they still would not shed light on the 
amendment's meaning since his view is hotly contested. Some tradi-
tionalist scholars, who feel the Ninth Amendment only forever places 
a line between the rights of the people and the powers of the govern-
ment, maintain that Madison argued for judicial review of only enu-
merated rights. 232 Therefore, this position believes Madison intended 
the Ninth Amendment to assure anti-federalists that the "Constitution 
would leave intact those individual rights contained in state constitu-
tions, statutes, and common law. "233 On the other hand, some affirm-
ative rights advocates, who contend the Ninth Amendment recognizes 
individual rights not listed in the first eight amendments, believe it is 
unlikely Madison thought uneneumerated rights would be left en-
tirely to the will of the legislature or the majority of the community, 
with only enumerated rights receiving judicial protection.234 Under 
this model, Madison feared that unenumerated rights would be left 
227. Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank, 516 U.S. 264,279 (1996) (Scalia,]., con-
curring) (citing United States v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 
319 (1953) (Jackson,]., concurring)). 
228. Bank One Chi., 516 U.S. at 283 (Scalia,]., concurring); see also Philip P. 
Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in 
Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L. REv. 199,205 n.31 (1999) (citing Lex-
econ Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28 n.t 
(1998) (noting that Justice Scalia joins entire opinion except section dis-
cussing and rejecting a party's appeal to legislative history)); Assocs. Com-
mercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 955 n. * (1997) (noting that Justice 
Scalia joins entire opinion except footnote discussing and rejecting legisla-
tive history to construe a statute). 
229. Tome, 513 U.S. at 167 (Scalia,]., concurring). 
230. Id. at 168. 
23l. See Barnett, supra note 182 at 3; Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning 
of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REv. 223, 260-61 (1983). 
232. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 182, at 20. 
233. Caplan, supra note 231, at 259. 
234. Barnett, supra note 182, at 20. 
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unprotected; thus, the Ninth Amendment was proposed and 
adopted.235 
While I realize statutes, cases, and other materials will forever be 
subject to differing interpretations, when a person's alleged intent be-
hind drafting a constitutional amendment from over two hundred 
years ago is in doubt, should we not take our medicine and concede 
we do not know what Madison believed the Ninth Amendment to 
mean? No scholar, to my knowledge, has any Madison source stating, 
"I believe the Ninth Amendment means .... " Instead, intent based 
scholars seem to rely on a grab bag of Madison's amendment propos-
als, letters, speeches, and writings with the hope of pulling it together 
to effectuate his Ninth Amendment beliefs.236 Once again, while I 
admit referring to analogous sources to a legal issue is an appropriate 
analytical tool, the situation here is different. There is no collective 
principle at issue in which a Madisionian belief from similar arenas 
can be applied to answer. Here, there is a curt constitutional amend-
ment. Absent a direct quotation from Madison interpreting it, I find 
it implausible to attempt to string together a panoply of his commen-
taries, over an unspecified time period, concerning multiple issues, 
and then conclude, with certainty mind you, that Madison believed 
this or that about the Ninth Amendment. 
The best example of the limitations present when attempting to 
utilize Madison's alleged intent behind the amendment is found in 
writings by the leading affirmative rights Ninth Amendment scholar, 
Randy E. Barnett.237 Barnett feels it is appropriate to "rely heavily on 
the explanation of constitutional rights provided by James Madison in 
his speech before the House of Representatives."238 Barnett places al-
most complete interpretative control over the Ninth Amendment in 
Madison's hands because Madison conceived the amendment and his 
"conception of constitutional rights is the most pertinent to an under-
standing of the Ninth Amendment's intended function."239 Barnett 
acknowledges the gap in his own theory by admitting that Madison's 
speech to the House of Representatives mayor may not reflect a clear 
consensus of Madison's contemporaries.240 Even with that conces-
sion, Barnett still claims that "if a robust theory of the unenumerated 
235. See Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1740. 
236. See generally Part.lII.C. 
237. Barnett has published and edited a number of pieces on the Ninth Amend-
ment. See, eg., THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND 
MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed. 1989); THE 
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH 
AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed. 1993); Randy E. Barnett, A Ninth Amend-
mentjor Today's Constitution, 26 VAL. D.L. REv. 419 (1991); Randy E. Barnett, 
Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1988). 
238. Barnett, supra note 182, at 3. 
239. [d. 
240. [d. 
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rights retained by the people is consistent with [Madison'sJ vision, 
then it will be quite difficult to sustain an objection to such a theory 
on the ground that it violates original intent."241 If Barnett admits 
that one Madison speech on the Ninth Amendment may not carry the 
day regarding the Ninth Amendment's intent, then how can he give 
authoritative weight to a vision correlating to that speech? Barnett 
could have created a more authoritative position, based on a concrete 
textual foundation, with: "if a robust theory of the unenumerated 
rights retained by the people is consistent with the text of the Ninth 
Amendment, then it will be quite difficult to sustain an objection to 
such a theory on the ground that it violates original intent." That 
statement eliminates the shaky intent ground that Barnett currently 
rests on. If you want a clear consensus of what Madison and his con-
temporaries thought the Ninth Amendment means, just look at what 
they agreed upon - the words and wording of the amendment itself. 
The Ninth Amendment's text is the best source to determine the clear 
consensus of its meaning. 
Scholars and judges who study Madison's intent also concede that 
his work never went unquestioned. The Ninth Amendment was "al-
most entirely the work of James Madison."242 However, the first draft 
of the Constitution drew criticism from representatives of the thirteen 
states.243 It has been noted that "[mJany in the state delegations to 
the Constitutional Convention complained that the document did not 
include a statement of the rights that individual citizens would enjoy 
under the new government."244 Madison drafted the first ten amend-
ments "[iJn an attempt to respond to those concerns"245 and he "was a 
vocal opponent of the inclusion of a bill of rights until it became clear 
the Constitution would not be ratified by the states without one."246 
The Bill of Rights formed after a classic political compromise between 
competing factions with complex, conflicting, and shifting attitudes 
toward liberty and the community.247 If we are going to attempt to 
discern the intent behind the Ninth Amendment, surely we must at-
tempt to discern all persons' intentions that helped mold the amend-
ment. Since this is impossible, I disavow it and do not consider the 
Founders' (including Madison's) alleged intent behind the Ninth 
Amendment. 
241. See id. 
242. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-89. 
243. Niles, supra note 13, at 117. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at ll8 n.ll7. 
247. JoEllen Lind, Liberty, Community, and the Ninth Amendment, 54 OHIO ST. LJ. 
1259, 1288 (1993). 
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Examining a prior draft of a Madison amendment shows that more 
than just minor alterations were made to his proposa1.248 Madison 
proposed the following: 
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the [C]onstitution, 
made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed 
as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by 
the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the 
[C]onstitution; but either as actual limitations of such pow-
ers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.249 
The above language was "split into two resolutions, which would 
form the thematic basis for separate amendments."25o The Tenth 
Amendment was formed stating, "[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."251 Madison's 
Ninth Amendment proposal stated, "[t]he enumeration in this Consti-
tution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people."252 The only changes after that were 
substituting a "[t]he" for the "this" and placing a comma after Consti-
tution.253 This, however, does not mean that Madison's proposal 
made up 99.9% of the Ninth Amendment because "significant 
changes were made in the language of the earliest proposals."254 
Madison may have conceived the Ninth Amendment, but a House of 
Representatives' Committee revised it.255 Madison served on that 
committee, but does that mean that the ideas, views, and overall input 
of other committee members are irrelevant?256 Just look to Madison's 
draft above that was divided into two separate amendments.257 A se-
vere change of that nature cannot be ignored even though the last 
revision appears to be slight. 
Scholars also unsurprisingly reach conflicting historical conclusions 
surrounding the proposal and ratification of the Ninth Amendment. 
248. See infra notes 249-257 and accompanying text. Drafting history is irrele-
vant and unauthoritative when interpreting subsequent legislation. See 
supra notes 225-230 and accompanying text. Therefore, I ignore previous 
drafts of legislation, including constitutional amendments, because the 
only thing we definitely know about them is that they were rejected. In this 
instance, though, I use Madison's prior draft of the Ninth Amendment for 
a very limited purpose - rebutting the argument that we should follow 
Madison's alleged intent behind it. 
249. Niles, supra note 13, at 120. 
250. [d. 
251. U.S. CaNST. amend. X. 
252. Niles, supra note 13, at 120 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 754 (Joseph 
Gales ed., 1789)). 
253. [d. at 120-21. 
254. [d. at 121 n.125. 
255. Barnett, supra note 182, at 2. 
256. [d. 
257. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
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These conflicting conclusions create even more confusion regarding 
the meaning of the Ninth Amendment. This is especially problematic 
here because all facts and interpretations must be precise for anyone 
to plausibly state what Madison thought about the Ninth Amendment 
over two hundred years ago. 
Incomplete facts, interpretations, and conclusions regarding the in-
tent behind the Ninth Amendment are found in how the legislature 
debated the amendment. One view states that there was almost no 
debate in the House of Representatives concerning the Ninth Amend-
ment258 before it was passed, and there was virtually no discussion of 
either Madison's first proposal or the Select Committee's draft.259 
Barnett, on the other hand, does not categorize the level of debate in 
the House of Representatives.26o Even if the correct view is that little 
debate occurred, what was that little debate about? Who said it? What 
does it mean in reference to what the Ninth Amendment actually 
means? Furthermore, differing views exist regarding the debate that 
occurred in the Senate. While the appropriate view seems to be that 
the amendment's treatment in the Senate is unknown because delib-
erations in that chamber were closed to the public,261 another view 
contends that "[t]here was no further discussion of this amendment 
in either the House or Senate."262 Which is it? If the debate in the 
Senate was closed to the public, how could we accurately state that 
there was no discussion of it in that body? This is precisely the type of 
unknown information that causes me to hedge before adopting 
Madison's alleged intent behind the Ninth Amendment. We are un-
certain about the degree of debate in the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, yet we are to lean on Madison's idea of the amend-
ment, while excluding the views of others involved in its genesis, 
evolution, and ratification. One person's views cannot supplant the 
views of the entire House and Senate.263 
Obviously, the collective input of many persons from state repre-
sentatives to state delegations influenced the drafting of the Ninth 
Amendment, as "the Constitution was not written and ratified by a 
single actor with clear motivations, but by many participants, most of 
whom left little or no record of their intentions. "264 There were many 
258. Niles, supra note 13, at 121 n.125. 
259. Sherry, supra note 205, at 1164. 
260. See Barnett, supra note 182, at 2. 
261. Leslie W. Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REv. 
627,632 (1956). 
262. Sherry, supra note 205, at 1164. 
263. For more conclusory statements about Madison's intent, which I find inap-
propriate, see Caplan, supra note 231, at 259. "Madison intended [the 
Ninth Amendment] to assure the antifederalists that the Constitution 
would leave intact those individual rights contained in the state constitu-
tions, statutes, and common law." [d. 
264. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1721. 
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Founders in Congress and the ratifying assemblies, speaking at many 
times.265 However, usually nothing about their intent, vision or moti-
vation behind the Ninth Amendment is included in an intent analysis. 
Do their views count? Are they considered meaningless? There is no 
reason to believe a consensus existed amongst the Founders regarding 
what unenumerated rights meant, nor is there any reason to believe 
that we could determine what that consensus was if it indeed ex-
isted.266 Thus, the "relevant 'intent' [behind the Ninth Amendment] 
may have been very general or nonexistent."267 
Again, most, not all, of Madison's proposed amendments were rati-
fied268 and there were minor alterations made to his text.269 Accord-
ingly, should we not investigate the intention behind those who 
declined a Madison amendment or caused an alteration in the lan-
guage? Their input had to be significant if it led to declining an origi-
nal proposal or changing the wording of subsequent amendment 
proposals. A sufficient number of people were not comfortable with 
an entire proposed Madison amendment or the text of an amend-
ment subsequently adopted.270 How then can we be comfortable with 
Madison's intent behind the Ninth Amendment? If only his intent 
counted, then why were alterations to his text made? Allowing 
Madison totalitarian control over the Ninth Amendment's meaning is 
troubling.271 Allowing his alleged view behind the Ninth Amendment 
to control its meaning discards numerous thoughts, opinions, conver-
sations, concessions, and other human interactions during a dynamic 
time period. Most of that information we are not privy to. Instead of 
attempting to overemphasize what small portion of that information is 
accessible, I err on the side of caution and disregard it. Therefore, I 
ensure that all of the ideas surrounding the Ninth Amendment gain 
recognition in the text that was affirmatively adopted. The consensus 
of varying views surrounding what the Ninth Amendment means is 
incorporated into one, unifying work - the text of the Ninth Amend-
ment. The best means to fulfill the grandiose ideal of understanding 
constitutional intent is to rely on the text agreed upon. Lawrence E. 
Mitchell quoted Justice Story's view that: 
265. Tribe, supra note 60, at 96. 
266. See generally Lind, supra note 247. At worst it may be said that the Founders 
intentions cannot be ascertained with finality; some thought one way and 
some another, thus, it wiil never be entirely clear exactly where their deci-
sive collective judgment came to rest. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1722 n.20 
(quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 15-16 (Irving-
ton Pub. 1962)). 
267. Tribe, supra note 60, at 96. 
268. Niles, supra note 13, at 117, citing 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 252, at 
630. 
269. Niles, supra note 13, at 117. 
270. See generally [d. 
271. See Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 CEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 1127, 1127 (1998). 
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The Constitution was adopted by the people of the United 
States. . . . In different states and in different conventions, 
different and very opposite objections are known to have 
prevailed; and might well be presumed to prevail. Opposite 
interpretations, and different explanations of different provi-
sions, may well be presumed to have been presented in dif-
ferent bodies .... And there can be no certainty, either that 
the different state conventions in ratifying the 
[C]onstitution, gave the same uniform interpretation to its 
language, or that, even in a single state convention, the same 
reasoning prevailed with a majority, much less with the 
whole of the supporters of it .... It is not to be presumed, 
that ... clauses [of the Constitution] were always understood 
in the same sense, or had precisely the same extent of opera-
tion. . . . Nothing but the text itself was adopted by the 
people.272 
Because nothing but the text was agreed upon; the text and not the 
intent is the appropriate starting place for a constitutional analysis. 
What originalists, or other intent based scholars, do not understand is 
that the Constitution's text is· the best source of the Founder's intent. 
By relying on certain persons' intentions, the original intent of the 
Constitution is not found. Original intent of the select few who left a 
semblance of their vision is found. The views of a precious few cannot 
be considered the original intent behind the Constitution. 
D. Historical Understanding of the Ninth Amendment Through Natural 
Law Principles 
While the text of the Ninth Amendment is the correct starting place 
for analyzing it, legal thought before its passage is relevant to its inter-
pretation. Prior legal thought and theory illustrates the mode of 
thought present at the Ninth Amendment's ratification.273 At that 
time, legal thought found its home in natural law principles.274 Natu-
ral law is premised upon a theory that'" [r] ules of natural justice are 
those which are universally recognized among civilized men.' "275 Nat-
ural law and natural rights refer to "infallibly delivered conclusions as 
272. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1722 (quoting 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 388-89 (1970) (emphasis added». 
273. See generally Raoul Berger, Natural Law and Judicial Review: Reflections of an 
Earthbound Lawyer, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 5, 5 (1992) (quoting Frederick Pol-
lock, The History of the Law of Nature: A Preliminary Study, 1 COLUM. L. REv. 
11, 30 (1901». 
274. Id. 
275. Id. at 5-14 (quoting Frederick Pollock, The History of the Law of Nature: A 
Preliminary Study, 1 COLUM. L. REv. 11,30 (1901). 
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to moral and metaphysical truths.,,276 Inanimate objects or human be-
ings are to follow the laws essential to their nature.277 
Natural law has evolved as an interpretative mechanism, whereby 
'" [t] raditional natural law is primarily and mainly an objective 'rule 
and measure,' a binding order to, and independent of the human 
will, while modem natural law tends to be primarily and mainly a se-
ries of 'rights,' of subjective claims originating in the human will.' "278 
A natural right is "generally recognized by a significant portion of con-
temporary society as one inextricably connected with the inherent dig-
nity of the individual."279 
The existence of natural law and natural rights was restated by phi-
losopher John Locke,280 "and passed into the general understanding 
of the Framers."281 Many of the most well known Founders expressed 
a belief in natural law principles.282 Thus, it is clear that the Founders 
276. Morton, supra note 146, at 724. 
277. [d. at 716. 
278. Berger, supra note 273, at 11 (quoting LEO STRAUSS, THE POLITICAL PHILOS-
OPHY OF HOBBES vii-viii (Elisa M. Sinclair trans., 1963)). 
279. Massey, supra note 166, at 331. 
280. 12 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 413 (1998). John Locke (1632-1704) 
was an English philosopher; his writings strongly influenced our Founding 
Fathers. According to Locke, all people possessed certain natural rights 
and duties including life, liberty and property. Locke believed that the 
duty of the state was to ensure the rights of the people since government 
can easily infringe on those rights. The justification for the state's existence 
must be asserted by its ability to guard human rights better than individuals 
acting on their own. [d. 
281. Morton, supra note 146, at 716; see also Sanders, supra note 3, at 764 (citing 
GORDAN S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REpUBLIC, 1776-81, at 
283 (1969) ("The Founders were, almost to a man, disciples of John 
Locke.")). 
282. Levy, supra note 207, at 2723. In 1775, Alexander Hamilton WTote '''the 
sacred rights of mankind ... are written ... in the whole volume of human 
nature ... and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.'" [d. 
(quoting BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATU-
RAL LAw 90-91 (1931) (quoting Alexander Hamilton)). In 1763, John Ad-
ams referred to "'the unalienable, indefeasible rights of men"'. [d. 
(quoting JOHN ADAMS, LIFE AND WORKS 440 (1951)). Adams told the peo-
ple, "'[y]ou have rights antecedent to all earthly governments: rights that 
cannot be repealed or restrained by human laws.'" Robert M. Hardaway, 
ET AL., The Right to Die and the Ninth Amendment: Compassion and Dying After 
Glucksberg and Vacco, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 313, 348-49 (1999) (quoting 
PATTERSON, supra note 224, reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 6, at 108. In 
1764, James Otis declared that human rights are derived from the law of 
nations that '''are natural, inherent, and inseparable rights.''' Levy, supra 
note 207, at 2723, (quoting Jordan]. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of 
Human Rights Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in 
Domestic Courts, 10 MICH.]. INT'L L. 543, 549 (1989) (quoting James Otis)). 
The Massachusetts Resolution of 1765 states '''there are certain essential 
rights ... which are founded in the law of God and nature, and are the 
common rights of mankind.'" [d. William Blackstone argued that despite 
the fact that individuals were required to surrender a portion of their natu-
ral liberty in return for the advantages of society, they "retained certain 
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believed in unwritten natural rights. 283 Because individual rights ex-
isted, they deserved judicial protection even if they were not con-
tained in the Constitution's text.284 Therefore, higher law, or natural 
law, is "arguably the great founding principle of American constitu-
tionalism."285 The social compact theory is the "philosophical back-
ground against which the Constitution was written."286 Locke 
expressed that natural rights comprise life, liberty, and property. It is 
no surprise that the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion states, "nor shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or 
fundamental rights that were not subject to government infringement." 
Wachtler, supra note 166, at 599 (citing 5 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION 
388 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (quoting 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 120-41 (1765)). Blackstone identified these 
rights as "personal security, personal liberty, and personal property." 
Wachtler, supra note 166, at 599-600 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra at 390-94). 
Samuel Adams said, '" [a] mong the Natural Rights of the Colonists are 
these[:] First a Right to Life; Secondly to Liberty; Thirdly to Property . ... 
Every natural Right not expressly given up or from the nature of a Social 
Compact necessarily ceded remains.'" Sanders, supra note 3, at 802 (quot-
ing Samuel Adams, The Rights of the Colonists 20 Nov. 1772, Writings 2:350-59, 
in 5 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION, supra at 394-95). ThomasJefferson said, 
"'Locke's little book on Government is perfect as far as it goes. ", Niles, 
supra note 13, at 109 n.73 (quoting MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS 
AND THE NEW REpUBLICANISM 19 (1994)). James Wilson said, "'the law of 
nature, though immutable in its principles, will be progressive in its opera-
tions and effects.'" Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitu-
tional, 100 YALE LJ. 1073, 1082 (1991) (quoting 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON 127 (J. Andrews ed. 1896)). 
283. Suzanna Sherry, Textualism and Judgment, 66 CEO WASH. L. REv. 1148, 1151 
(1998); see also Sherry, supra note 205, at 1146 ("[A] constitution was not 
itself seen as positive, enacted law but rather as a declaration of first 
principles.") . 
284. Id. 
285. David N. Mayer, The Natural Rights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to 
Professor McAffee, 16 S. ILL. U. LJ. 313, 326 (1992). 
286. Kevin W. Saunders, Privacy and Social Contract: A Defense of Judicial Activism in 
Privacy Cases, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 811, 822 (1991) (citing Edward S. Corwin, The 
"Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REv. 
149,383-98 (1928)); see also Haddon, supra note 166, at 103 ("Few would 
dispute that at the time of the Constitution's framing and the discussion of 
proposed amendments there was a general belief in natural law."); Levy, 
supra note 207, at 2722 ("References to natural law as the source for ina-
lienable rights of mankind were pervasive at the time immediately before 
the Constitution's adoption."); Massey, supra note 166, at 314 (stating that 
the Founders "relied upon natural law principles in formulating constitu-
tional guarantees"); Rosen, supra note 282, at 1075 ("Virtually all commen-
tators agree that the Framers and ratifiers of the Bill of Rights believed in 
natural rights .... "); Saunders, supra at 822 n.78 (citing Randy E. Barnett, 
Are Unenumerated Constitutional Rights the Only Rights We Have? The Case of 
Associational Freedom, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 101,103-04 (1987)) (not-
ing that the Founders were influenced by the Lockean philosophy of rights 
first and government second). But see ELY, supra note 144, at 39 (stating that 
natural law theory was not universally accepted by the Founders and was 
probably not even the majority view at the time). 
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property, without due process of law .... "287 An evaluation of natural 
law and natural rights theory, therefore, provides persuasive historical 
understanding surrounding the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
Stephen Macedo appropriately describes how natural law principles 
attach to the Constitution with: 
Natural law or "higher law" principles are not yanked from 
the sky and slung onto constitutional hooks. Rather, an 
open ended and complex document is read in a certain 
spirit: in light of the principles that seem to underlie its spe-
cific phrases and larger structures, principles that help justify 
the document's more specific aspects. Indeed, by interpret-
ing the document in light of its underlying moral principles 
we extend the document's meaning in a way that vindicates 
the preamble's claim that the Constitution is meant to ap-
proximate justice and other basic moral goals. The point is 
to read this document and the history of its interpretation as 
best they can be, drawing out latent principles, understand-
ing the whole as attempting to realize the preamble's ends of 
justice, liberty, and the general welfare.28 
Natural rights theory can neither explain the text of the Ninth 
Amendment nor show the intent behind it. The written Constitution 
is the highest law of society,289 but that does not mean that there is no 
room for principles of natural law. 290 Natural law shows us where the 
Founders were coming from because "it is beyond serious dispute that 
natural law principles colored the outlook of those who drafted the 
Declaration of Independence and later the Constitution."291 Al-
though the text of the Ninth Amendment governs unenumerated 
287. 
288. 
289. 
290. 
291. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law .... "); DEClARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of American principle that govern-
ment does not bestow or grant rights upon the people, but that the people 
are born with such rights - and that a government that seeks to suppress 
these unalterable rights does so at its own peril." Robert E. Hirshon, Peace 
and Freedom: As We "tnjoy the Benefits of Independence, We Should Reflect on its 
Beginnings, 88 A.BA J. 8, 8 Uuly 2002); see also Niles, supra note 13, at 109 
("Locke's political doctrine ... contains all the defining doctrines of the 
American Declaration of Independence."); Rosen, supra note 282, at 1078 
("[The Founders] of the Bill of Rights recognized the natural rights enu-
merated in the Declaration of Independence .... "). 
Macedo, supra note 195, at 40. 
Berger, supra note 273, at 26. 
Id.; see also Massey, supra note 166, at 343 (noting that the Founders "con-
ceived of both enumerated and unenumerated rights as consisting of posi-
tive and natural rights."); Pope, supra note 154, at 450 ("The Ninth 
Amendment says, in effect, to look for guidance in the natural law."). 
Wachtler, supra note 166, at 599 (citing 5 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 282, at 395-99). 
210 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 32 
rights issues, it was based upon some prior principle. The Ninth 
Amendment did not come out of thin air and the 1700's are nowhere 
near the start of human existence. Accordingly, a historical under-
standing of the principles behind the Ninth Amendment provide sup-
port for interpreting it. 
An examination of Ninth Amendment principles is important be-
cause natural law theorists presuppose that it is a basic moral and met-
aphysical truth "that all human beings possess natural rights."292 
Rights and freedoms are ultimate values and the creation of a system 
of laws necessarily involves curtailing these rights and restrictions on 
human freedom.293 Since people by nature are free, equal, and inde-
pendent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the 
political power of another without consenting to it. 294 Therefore, any 
governmental assertion of power must be justified by referring to its 
pursuit of achieving the peace and security of its citizenry.295 
One can at least make a strong case that unenumerated rights were 
understood to derive from the natural rights doctrine.296 The philo-
sophical context in which the Constitution and the Ninth Amend-
ment were written indicates that the rights retained in the Ninth 
Amendment are natural rights. 297 Therefore, natural law's textual 
home is the Ninth Amendment.298 Consequently, the Ninth Amend-
ment occupies a unique place in the law because it provides a positive 
law basis for a natural rights theory.299 Bruce N. Morton explained 
how the Ninth Amendment's text adopted natural rights law: 
The meaning of [the Ninth Amendment] is not subject to 
reasonable dispute. The key word is "retained." Human be-
ings have rights which precede (temporally and logically) 
292. Morton, supra note 166, at 719. 
293. Id. at 728. 
294. Id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GoVERNMENT § 6 
(Babbs-Merrill ed., 1952) (1690). 
295. Id. at 73l. 
296. Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights, Positivism and the Ninth Amendment: A Re-
sponse to McAffee, 16 S. ILL. U. LJ. 327, 332 (1992). 
297. Saunders, supra note 286, at 823 (citing PATI'ERSON, supra note 224, at 19 
("The Ninth Amendment ... is a basic statement of the inherent natural 
rights of the individual. ... "); see also Berger, supra note 200, at 1521 (citing 
BARNETI', supra note 6, at 6 (stating that natural rights are identified with 
the rights retained by the people in the Ninth Amendment); Massey, supra 
note 166, at 322 ("[T]he Ninth Amendment was intended ... to serve as a 
barrier to encroachment upon natural rights .... "); Sanders, supra note 3, 
at 805 ("As a statement that ... natural rights ... are not to be abrogated, 
the Ninth Amendment ... [is] a silent sentinel guarding liberties not other-
wise named in the Constitution."). 
298. Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 61 U. 
CIN. L. REv. 49, 50 (1992); see also Levy, supra note 207, at 2724 ("[T]he 
entire corpus of jus cogens humanum norms is incorporated into the Consti-
tution through the Ninth Amendment.") (emphasis added). 
299. Hampton, supra note 166, at 367. 
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those explicitly conferred by this Constitution; they are the 
natural rights possessed by all human beings independently 
of human fiat. Specific constitutional provisions do not, and 
could not, affect these rights. 30o 
211 
The interplay between natural rights and constitutional rights is 
reminiscent of the chicken and egg argument - which came first: nat-
ural rights or constitutional rights. Here, though, it is a little more 
obvious: the Constitution was based on the idea that natural rights 
existed.30l Therefore, the Ninth Amendment ensures a description of 
natural rights exists in the Constitution. It was, and remains, carefully 
worded to prevent the sort of denial of rights that we see more and 
more often. By enacting a mechanism to evaluate Ninth Amendment 
unenumerated rights claims, the causal link between natural rights 
theory adopted in the Ninth Amendment and its application to cur-
rent (and future) legal issues will be complete. Thus, natural rights 
principles effectuated through the Ninth Amendment will enshrine 
natural rights to the people, thereby curtailing the denial of those very 
rights. 
These natural rights principles are not confined to the boundaries 
of philosophy and theory. The principle that human beings retain 
natural rights is a part of the law. Natural law rested at the foundation 
of several early decisions of the Supreme Court, most notably when 
the Court considered the rights of individuals.302 In Calder v. Bull,303 
retroactive civil laws did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.304 The 
Court stated, '" [a] n act of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law) 
contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be 
300. Morton, supra note 146, at 751. Morton stated: 
[T]he presumption is not in favor of governmental authority, but 
rather, against it. Because natural rights are presumed to have 
been retained by the people unless a basis for their delegation to 
the government can be specifically demonstrated, this theory 
places substantial and general limitations on the power of govern-
ment. Because the legislative power is exercised, in Locke's politi-
cal theory, by a democratically elected majority, this limitation is, 
ipso facto, upon the power of the democratically elected majority. 
Id. at 731; see also Mayer, supra note 285, at 325 (citing David N. Mayer, The 
jurisprudence of Christopher G. Tiedeman: A Study in the Failure of Laissez-Faire 
Constitutionalism, 55 Mo. L. REv. 93 (1990)) (advocating judicial enforce-
ment of the unwritten constitution through natural law based laissez-faire 
constitutionalism) . 
301. Morton, supra note 146, at 714. 
302. Wachtler, supra note 166, at 611 (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 
(1796)); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); United States v. 
Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805); Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137; see 
also Hampton, supra note 166, at 351 (citing 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1823) (No. 3230) (noting that fundamental principles include the right to 
pursue and obtain happiness and safety)). 
303. 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386 (1798). 
304. Id. at 393. 
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considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.' "305 In Fletcher v. 
Peck,306 the Court used the Contract Clause to invalidate a Georgia 
statute that reclaimed lands previously granted by a bribed legisla-
ture. 307 The Court stated that the statute would also violate" 'the gen-
eral principles which are common to our free institutions.' "308 In 
Wilkinson v. Leland,309 Justice Story concluded: 
The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to re-
quire that the rights of personal liberty and private property 
should be held sacred. At least no court of justice in this 
country would be warranted in assuming that the power to 
violate and disregard them - a power so repugnant to the 
common principles of justice and civil liberty - lurked 
under any general grant of legislative authority, or ought to 
be implied from any general expressions of the will of the 
people.310 
Natural law principles, while waning, extended to decisions in the 
late Nineteenth Century. In Citizens' Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka,311 
the Court conceded that there are rights in every free government 
beyond the State's control that ensure the existence of the social com-
pact and must be respected by the government.312 The Court be-
lieved that the social compact limited government power.313 
Furthermore, it did not restrict itself to aspects of the social compact 
found in the Constitution's text; instead, it argued in terms of theoret-
ical principles.314 This conveys a balance between the Constitution's 
text and the natural law principles it was based upon. A wholly textual 
vision of rights ignores the natural law principles creating the text it-
self. In Munn v. lllinois,315 the Court concluded that although a body 
305. John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY LJ. 967, 1001 
(1993) (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388) (emphasis omitted). Yoo also 
indicates that in Terret v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815), the Court 
invalidated a Virginia law that dispossessed the Episcopal Church of land. 
The Court felt the law was inconsistent with the right of citizens to the free 
enjoyment of their property legally acquired. Id. at 1001; see also Chisholm 
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (Wilson,]., concurring) (the right of 
an individual to sue another state was upheld and states, like individuals, 
are bound by laws through compact); Marks, supra note 153, at 479 (citing 
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,255 (1796) (Patterson,]., concurring) 
(confiscating property in times of war is incompatible with principles of 
justice and policy, moral sense, reason and natural equity». 
306. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
307. Yoo, supra note 305, at 100l. 
308. Id. at 1O0l. 
309. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829). 
310. Id. at 657. 
31l. 87 U.S. (1 Wall.) 655 (1874). 
312. Id. at 662-63. 
313. Saunders, supra note 286, at 81B. 
314. Id. 
315. 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
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politic is a social compact wherein the whole people covenants with 
each citizen that all shall be governed by laws for the common good, it 
does not confer power upon the whole people to control rights that 
are purely and exclusively private.316 Once again the Court offered a 
clear view that the legislature's power is limited under the social com-
pact, and once again these limitations did not appear to be confined 
to those in the Constitution's text.317 
Accordingly, the text of the Constitution is not an exclusive source 
for determining the existence of unenumerated rights. The text is the 
appropriate starting point and its meaning cannot be violated; how-
ever, an evaluation of the existence of unenumerated rights cannot be 
forever entombed in the text of the Ninth Amendment. Supplement-
ing the text with the natural law theory it was premised upon and 
subsequent case law that applies those principles conforms to the text 
and further explains the law, thereby strengthening the text.31S Leav-
ing the text without the foundation of natural rights could place its 
meaning in jeopardy. A wholly textualist approach provides the weak-
est restraints on judges and is an inappropriate invitation to judicial 
creativity because broadly phrased terms allow judges to utilize those 
provisions however desired.319 An active role for the judiciary in the 
identification and articulation of unenumerated rights gives the Ninth 
Amendment its literal meaning in light of the Founders' natural law 
tradition: there are fundamental rights that exist outside the Constitu-
tion that deserve as much protection as enumerated rights.320 
Natural law also advances a form of legal thought ensuring that af-
firmative rights retained by the people are not unnecessarily, or in 
current times, unconstitutionally infringed upon.321 The major task 
of jurisprudence is to continually assess legal restrictions to determine 
when they exceed the permissible boundaries of tacit consent, and 
infringe upon substantive natural rights, which are always retained by 
the people and cannot be bargained away.322 
This pronouncement builds on the theory of natural law and natu-
ral rights and mandates a form of jurisprudence ensuring the survival 
of natural law and natural rights. In our system of government, this 
commandment is essential because the judiciary determines whether 
316. Id. at 124 (quoting the preamble to Part I, Article 12 of the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts). 
317. Saunders, supra note 286, at 818. 
318. This does not mean that I agree (or disagree) with all the judicial decisions 
based upon natural law principles. It means, however, that I agree with 
courts invoking natural law principles in their analysis. 
319. David A. Strauss, The New Textualism In Constitutional Law, 66 CEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 1153, 1157 (1998). 
320. Wachtler, supra note 166, at 610. 
321. Morton, supra note 146, at 732. 
322. Id. at 732. Since society is committed to government by consent, "society 
must accept an active role for the judiciary." Saunders, supra note 286, at 
813. 
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an unenumerated right exists under the Constitution.323 If the judici-
ary does not apply a legal analysis adopting natural law principles as 
persuasive components in evaluating the law, the principles of natural 
law will not be applied, but will remain as dormant philosophical 
doctrines. 
E. The Correct Approach to Evaluate Unenumerated Rights Claims 
Some may regard the Ninth Amendment as a recent discovery and 
some may have forgotten it, but since 1791 it has been a basic part of 
the Constitution that federal judges are sworn to uphold.324 It is "a 
uniquely central text in any attempt to take seriously the process of 
construing the Constitution."325 Through the text of the Ninth 
Amendment we can see that "the law is not static"326 and that "every 
contingency that might threaten individual rights"327 was not foreseen 
at the enactment of the Constitution.328 This text-based command-
ment for progressive legal thought proclaims that the law of nature 
will be progressive in its operation and effects; thus cotemporary soci-
ety will evolve in the future to produce even better results.329 
The Ninth Amendment incorporates unenumerated rights into the 
Constitution, directly protecting them from state action330 through 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.331 The Ninth Amendment is not a rule of construction, but 
rather a recognition of other rights332 containing a "'fountain of 
law.' "333 A reasonable interpretation of the Ninth Amendment in-
cludes the theory that it "could sanction an unlimited range" of 
un enumerated rights.334 
The meaning of the Ninth Amendment may be clear, but its impli-
cations for constitutional adjudication are not.335 The Ninth Amend-
ment's text does not prescribe how to determine what unenumerated 
rights are. Because the text does not enunciate a standard, we have to 
323. See Wachtler, supra note 166, at 597. 
324. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491 (Goldberg, j., concurring); see also U.S. CONST. 
art. VI (requiring federal judges to take an oath or affirmation that they 
uphold the Constitution). 
325. Tribe, supra note 60, at 100. 
326. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1728. 
327. [d. 
328. !d. 
329. WILSON, supra note 282, at 126-27. 
330. See generally Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1731. 
331. U.S. CONST. amend. XN, § 1. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States." !d. 
332. Paust, supra note 166, at 254. 
333. Caplan, supra note 231, at 226 (quoting CHARLES LUND BLACK, DECISION Ac-
CORDING TO LAw 44 n.47 (1981». 
334. Thapa, supra note 187, at 142. 
335. Berger, supra note 200, at 1511 (citing BARNETT, supra note 6, at 4). 
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develop some useful, text-based methodology to discover the actual 
content of these rights.336 At first glance, this appears to be a constitu-
tional conundrum. In reality though, it is once again a brilliant por-
trayal of humbleness in the Constitution. If the Founders could not 
determine what all the rights retained by the people were in the 
1700's, how could they enunciate what legal standard to apply to eval-
uate unenumerated rights issues? Because no textual basis exists to 
determine what an unenumerated right is, a test must be developed to 
determine whether something is an unenumerated right within the 
context of the Ninth Amendment. 
To evaluate whether or not an alleged unenumerated right exists 
under the Ninth Amendment, another dreaded three-part constitu-
tional law test must be adopted. While I see law school students exas-
perating as they hear of another three-part constitutional law inquiry, 
unfortunately there needs to be one here. It is as follows: First, is the 
alleged right governed by any other provision of the Constitution? If 
so, then that provision applies, the three-part test ends, and there is 
no Ninth Amendment issue.337 If no other portion of the Constitu-
tion governs the alleged right, then step two occurs. If step two ap-
plies, then the Court determines whether the alleged right was 
considered a right retained by the people at the enactment of the 
Constitution, or if it has evolved into a right that is currently retained 
by the people. If a preponderance of the evidence shows that, at ei-
ther time period, the people have not retained the right, then it is not 
a right retained by the people. If at either point in history, however, a 
preponderance of the evidence shows the right was retained by the 
people, then it is considered an enumerated right. Under the third 
step, the Court establishes a standard of review. A rational basis test 
applies to a non-right, wherein the challenger has the burden of prov-
ing that the law in question is not rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.33B A strict scrutiny test applies to an unenumer-
ated right, wherein the government has the burden of proving that 
the law in question is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling 
interest. 339 
Step one is a gatekeeper, which prevents a reviewing court from 
spending any unnecessary time reviewing a non-Ninth Amendment 
336. See generally Paust, supra note 166, at 235 (noting that the courts have a 
responsibility to secure the rights guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment 
through "rational and policy-serving judicial decision-making"). 
337. The first step of my analysis is similar to the first step in The Honorable 
Robert W. Sweet & Edward A. Harris, just and Unjust Wars: The War on the 
War on Drugs - Some Moral and Constitutional Dimensions of the War on Drugs, 
87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1302, 1361-62 (1993) (reviewing THOMAS SZASZ, OUR 
RIGHT TO DRUGS: THE CASE FOR A FREE MARKET (Praeger Publishers ed., 
1992)). 
338. See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997). 
339. Id. at 721. 
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claim. If another portion of the Constitution governs the legal ques-
tion, then that portion of the Constitution applies. The only hurdle 
in this step is resolving current precedent supporting substantive due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, an argu-
ment can be made that if the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses a 
substantive due process component, then that provision should apply 
to determine if an unenumerated right exists. While substantive due 
process is current law, and deserves a good degree of stare decisis treat-
ment, one need look no further then the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Ninth Amendment. If an unenumerated right is 
alleged, then the Ninth Amendment clearly governs that question. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has its man-
date - provide fair procedures when the state is attempting to deny 
life, liberty, or property.340 Stare decisis is not an inexorable command 
when interpreting the Constitution.341 In constitutional cases, it is at 
its weakest342 because it is always possible to appeal behind doctrinal 
precedent in order to challenge current wisdom with what the Consti-
tution's text commands.343 While the doctrine of stare decisis demands 
some special justification for a departure from longstanding prece-
dent,344 we must remember that: 
A judge looking at a constitutional decision may have com-
pulsions to revere past history and accept what was once writ-
ten. But he remembers above all else that it is the 
Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the 
gloss which his predecessors have put on it.345 
340. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
341. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (citing State Oil Co. v. 
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)); 
see also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-08 (1932) 
(Brandeis,]., dissenting) (stating that stare decisis is not a universal inexora-
ble command). 
342. Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding l<-ra to 
the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REv. 647, 704 (1999) (quoting Agostini, 521 
U.S at 235-38). 
343. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REv. 659, 697 (1987). 
344. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443 (citing U.S. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 
843,856 (1996)). 
345. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Justice Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 736 
(1949)); see also Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 
HARV.].L. & PUB. POL'y 23, 29-30 (1994) (arguing that judicial power in-
cludes a structural inference that the Constitution is supreme over all com-
peting sources of law); Lee, supra note 342, at 704 n.318 (citing Graves v. 
New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter,]., con-
curring) (stating that the only correct rule of decision is the "Constitution 
itself and not what we have said about it"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. LJ. 217, 319 
n.349 (1994) ("Uudges are bound to interpret the law as they understand 
it], not as it has been understood by others."). 
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In federal constitutional cases, where correction through legislative 
action is practically impossible, the Supreme Court has often over-
ruled its earlier decisions.346 Essentially, the Court bows to the lessons 
of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing the pro-
cess of trial and error is appropriate in the judicial function.347 
Step two provides a court with a list of criteria to evaluate an 
unenumerated right issue. Since fundamental rights are catalogued 
in documents the American people have formally or informally rati-
fied,348 an evaluation of an unenumerated right issue must look to this 
diverse range of sources. This provides a more document-supported 
approach that invites judges to canvass nonjudicial legal sources, state 
and federal law, state constitutions, and other related sources for epi-
stemic guidance.349 The sources reflect society's view of the alleged 
unenumerated right from before the beginning of our nation up to 
the present time. They provide insight into the view of the alleged 
right from the Constitution and all three branches of state and federal 
government. The factors also increase the chance of recognizing the 
right when a high level of liberty is denied by a law curtailing the 
alleged right, while balancing that notion by decreasing the chance of 
recognizing the right when it presents a substantial risk of harm to 
others. The sources are not limited to government or legal items that 
may exclude important and pertinent views of the behavior in ques-
tion. The view of those most committed to analyzing the issue are 
valued, as well as the view of the world community. The guiding prin-
ciple upon which the Constitution was formed, natural law theory, 
also provides insight as to whether the alleged right conforms with the 
ideals upon which the Founders based our system of government. 
Specifically, courts should look to the following sources to deter-
mine if an unenumerated right exists under the Ninth Amendment: 
(l) does the alleged right fit within the overall structure and meaning 
of the Bill of Rights; (2) what is the status of federal and state laws 
governing the alleged right and related behavior; (3) what is the level 
of enforcement of those laws; (4) what is the status of case law regard-
ing the related behavior; (5) what is the level of liberty prohibited by 
the law in question;350 (6) what is the level of potential social harm 
346. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406. 
347. [d. 
348. Amar, supra note 59, at 123. While Amar discussed fundamental rights and 
their protection under the Privileges and Immunties Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, I believe the Ninth Amendment governs unenumer-
ated rights and the Privileges and Immunities Clause incorporates those 
rights against the states. 
349. [d. 
350. Marc C. Niles states that the appropriate question posed in Ninth Amend-
ment adjudication should be "whether government action that places a sig-
nificant burden on the expression of personal autonomy or freedom is 
motivated by an unconstitutional interest in controlling private action or 
private choices." Niles, supra note 13, at 124. An unenumerated right need 
218 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 32 
prevented by the law in question;351 (7) what is the view of the behav-
ior through scholarly sources and documents; (8) what is the world's 
view of the behavior;352 and (9) whether the alleged right is consistent 
with natural law principles. 
The overall structure and meaning of the Constitution provides a 
text-based standard to determine if the right at issue is similar enough 
to other rights protected to warrant recognition as an unenumerated 
right. Justice Thurgood Marshall explained a similar process of com-
paring non-constitutional interests to specific constitutional guaran-
tees by determining that as the nexus between a specific constitutional 
guarantee and a non-constitutional interest draws closer, the non-con-
not be a private action or choice to exist. The text of the amendment men-
tions nothing in regard to public versus private rights. The right of an in-
structor to teach foreign languages and of a student's parents to engage 
them so as to instruct their child was protected by substantive due process. 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922). The parents' decision may be 
their private choice, but allowing an instructor to teach a topic to a group 
of students in a public school is not a private right. Recent references to 
the Ninth Amendment and enumerated or fundamental rights are not re-
lated to private rights. The Ninth Amendment supported a First Amend-
ment right for the press to attend criminal trials, which are held before the 
public in a public setting. Justice Douglas claimed there is an unenumer-
ated right to pure air and water, and to vote in state elections. Lubin v. 
Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 721 n. * (1974); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 
233-34 (1971) (Douglas, j., dissenting). Those rights are available to the 
public by public bodies, and are accessible in public settings. Moreover, 
many enumerated rights are public in nature. See U.S. CONST. amend. I 
(freedom to exercise religion, free speech, freedom of the press, right of 
peaceful assembly); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (accused receives public crimi-
nal trial). Accordingly, it is textually inaccurate to value only privacy ori-
ented unenumerated rights, thus, I measure the level of liberty deprived by 
a law, not the level of privacy deprived by a law. 
351. Niles argues that private and public boundaries "should be viewed as con-
veying the distinction between acts that pose a potential public threat and 
acts that do not." Niles, supra note 13, at 125. An unenumerated right can 
exist and pose a public threat. For example, if the right to use contracep-
tives and the right to an abortion were granted under the Ninth Amend-
ment, a potential harm (albeit extremely remote) could be the elimination 
of the human population in the United States if all people use contracep-
tives and/or all pregnant women have abortions. Potential harms also de-
rive from enumerated constitutional rights. See U.S. CONST. amend. I 
(controversial free speech inciting negative reaction, division, or violence); 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (suppressing evidence may allow guilty persons to 
go unpunished); U.S. CONST. amend. V (suppressing incriminating state-
ments may allow guilty persons to go unpunished); U.S. CONST. amend. VI 
(dismissing case for violating speedy trial rights may allow guilty persons to 
go unpunished); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (granting bail may allow guilty 
persons to go unpunished if they flee). Because unenumerated rights can 
exist that pose a potential harm, I only weigh the level of potential harm 
prevented as one component of my criteria. The risk of potential harm is 
not dispositive regarding unenumerated rights issues. 
352. See generally Murphy, supra note 166, at 481 (noting that the statements and 
practices of the international community give status to a right that should 
be protected from legislative encroachment by the United States' courts). 
2003] Revitalizing the Ninth Amendment 219 
stitutional interest becomes more fundamenta1. 353 Next, a review of 
federal and state law announces the elected legislatures' view, shed-
ding light on how people viewed the issue throughout history. The 
enforcement of the law, however, may be the most telling factor. 
Some old laws remain on the books even though they are rarely, if 
ever, enforced.354 This provides the most current example of the peo-
ple's view of the law, as it shows whether the legislature is pushing for 
enforcement, whether the executive is actually enforcing it, and how 
the people are reacting to that enforcement.355 As the law prohibits 
more liberty, less deference should be given to the law. However, as 
the law prevents more harm to others, less deference should be given 
to the alleged right. 
Finally, more deference should be given to the right if it conforms 
with natural law principles, the theory upon which the Constitution 
was grounded. This guarantees that the ideals creating the Constitu-
tion forever speak to the question of whether an unenumerated right 
exists. Adjudicating unenumerated rights issues without reference to, 
and persuasive support from natural law principles eliminate the very 
thought process and logical deduction that established unenumerated 
rights in the first place. 
If an analysis of those factors shows our society recognized the al-
leged right as being fundamental in the late 1700's or it has been 
subsequently recognized, and it is not a right that has been subse-
quently revoked by society, then it should be considered an 
unenumerated right today. In other words, the action or behavior 
may not have been sanctioned in the 1700's, but as society grew and 
changed, it became accepted as a right retained by the people. This 
ensures that today's legal issues are governed by today's attitudes. For 
the Ninth Amendment does not prescribe that unenumerated rights 
were forever determined in the 1700's: it does not say, "[t]he enumer-
ation in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people at this time."356 The 
"at this time" language is not present. Therefore, there is no text set-
ting or limiting the time period when rights can form or be recog-
nized. In fact, to place an arbitrary line in the sand fixing when 
unenumerated rights can be recognized would be a clear-cut case of 
judicial activism, in which a court would legislate a new provision into 
the Ninth Amendment. 
Step three provides the standard of review when evaluating an 
unenumerated right issue. If the Ninth Amendment recognizes an 
353. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-03 (1972) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). 
354. See generally Poe, 367 U.S. 497. 
355. See generally Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479; Poe, 367 U.S. at 
SOL 
356. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
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unenumerated right, it must be considered "fundamental," thus, war-
ranting strict scrutiny review. The Ninth Amendment's text mandates 
treatment of unspecified, unenumerated rights on par with enumer-
ated rights.357 The terms "inalienable" or "fundamental" are not 
found in the first ten amendments when referring to a protected 
right.358 Why then would the Framers limit Ninth Amendment rights 
to those that are not considered fundamental?359 A fair reading of 
the Ninth Amendment, along with the rest of the Bill of Rights, leads 
to the conclusion that all of the rights protected by the amendments 
were considered fundamental when they were ratified.360 Concluding 
that unenumerated rights are deserving of protection only when they 
are embraced by a social consensus relegates them to a distinctly lower 
and more suspect status than enumerated rights - a status barely enti-
tled to respect and not subject to full veneration.361 If an enumerated 
right is not recognized, courts will then apply the rational basis test to 
review the law in question, giving tremendous deference to the law 
and almost assuredly upholding it. This is standard practice now 
when no showing of a fundamental right is proven.362 
My approach will not "open the Pandora's box of judicial review"363 
or "provide 'a bottomless well in which the judiciary can dip for the 
formation of undreamed of 'rights' in their limitless discretion."'364 
These fears are halted at the door of this approach. By applying a 
filter step first, I defer non-Ninth Amendment issues to their appropri-
ate constitutional standard, thereby, limiting the number and type of 
unenumerated rights claims. The second step sets forth a firm stan-
dard of determining whether or not unenumerated rights exist, which 
binds lawyers and judges to similar principles. These principles will 
now have added foundation and force because they will attach to the 
amendment that formulated them, instead of an amendment estab-
lishing no such principles. This prevents a shifting form of jurispru-
dence wherein the standards and ideals governing the adjudication of 
unenumerated rights are transferred to the procedural components 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. When that 
flawed transfer is prevented, a more structured and organized ap-
proach to determining unenumerated rights evolves because the ana-
lytical mechanism meets the confines of the Ninth Amendment. 
Through that process, I am able to propose a more exacting method-
ology to govern unenumerated rights than is currently available in 
357. Massey, supra note 166, at 343. 
358. Murphy, supra note 166, at 456. 
359. Id. 
360. Id. 
361. Tribe, supra note 60, at 106. 
362. See U.s. v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 956 (7th Cir. 1998); King v. Edgar, 1996 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17999, *13 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
363. Barnett, supra note 182, at 22; see also Thapa, supra note 187, at 155. 
364. Barnett, supra note 182, at 22 (quoting Berger, supra note 273, at 2). 
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substantive due process jurisprudence. Accordingly, this approach de-
creases the chances of incorrect jurisprudence on both sides of the 
unenumerated rights debate. My approach limits the ability of the 
bench to ignore valid unenumerated rights, while at the same time 
eliminating a vague pronouncement that would allow for judges to 
grant unenumerated rights at a whim. 
The cornerstone of this formulation rests with the even playing field 
established in the second step of my analysis. By setting a preponder-
ance of evidence standard, there is no presumption that an 
unenumerated right exists, nor is there a presumption one does not 
exist. To set a standard of proof above a preponderance of the evi-
dence on the government to prove an unenumerated right does not 
exist would fail to follow the text of the Ninth Amendment because it 
does not indicate or infer that the particular unenumerated right at 
issue exists. The amendment only states that there are other rights 
retained by the people.365 There is no presumption of liberty that 
requires states to show that legislation infringing upon the citizen's 
liberty was a necessary exercise of its police power.366 The presump-
tion of an un enumerated right "exalts the individual over the state, 
contrary to the Founders' design."367 To place a burden on the gov-
ernment would give rights advocates an inappropriate head start no 
matter how fruitful or fruitless their unenumerated right claim is. Be-
cause I do not give rights advocates a head start and a presumption 
that the alleged unenumerated right exists, there is an affirmative 
check on allowing for unending grants of unenumerated rights. On 
the other hand, to set a standard of proof above a preponderance of 
the evidence upon the individual challenger to prove an unenumer-
ated right exists would fail to follow the text of the Ninth Amendment 
as well. A citizen should not have to overcome any burden or proof-
based obstacle favoring the government to validate an unenumerated 
right. That would give non-text-based deference to the government 
and presume, to some degree, before any analysis takes place that the 
people do not retain the alleged unenumerated right. This flies in 
the face of the Ninth Amendment. If the people retain the 
unenumerated right, it is recognized. If the people do not retain it, it 
will not be recognized. Any burden of proof aiding either govern-
ment regulation or right recognition fails to meet the tenets of the 
Ninth Amendment. 
365. U.S. CONST amend. IX. 
366. Berger, supra note 200, at 1509 (quoting BARNETT, supra note 6, at lO, 12). 
367. [d. 
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IV. INACCURACIES IN THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO IN-
TERPRETING THE NINTH AMENDMENT 
A. The Traditional Approach's Theory 
The traditional view of the Ninth Amendment ignores its text for a 
conservative-based jurisprudence. Traditionalists argue that the Ninth 
Amendment does not protect any substantive rights beyond those ex-
pressly enumerated in the first eight amendments.368 This approach 
argues that "[ t] he amendments to the Constitution proposed by the 
several state conventions forbade an inference of extended powers 
from specific limitations on powers. These proposals powerfully rein-
force the conclusion that the mischief that Federalists feared was the 
subversion of the scheme of enumerated powers and residual 
rights."369 The traditional approach places an inappropriate reliance 
on Madison's statement that "if a line can be drawn between the pow-
ers granted and the rights retained, it would seem to be the same 
thing."37o That view contends that the Tenth Amendment, which 
states, "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, 
respectively, or to the people,"371 lends support, if not authoritative 
weight, to their position.372 The traditional approach proclaims that 
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are two sides of the same coin,373 
thereby forever placing a division between powers allotted to govern-
ment and rights retained by the people.374 The traditional approach 
proposes that the Ninth Amendment's retained rights allude to the 
368. 
369. 
370. 
371. 
372. 
373. 
374. 
Cooper, supra note 195; Phillip Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommoda-
tion of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REv. 239, 315-17 (1989); Richard Kay, Ad-
herence to Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and 
Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 269-73 (1988); Thomas B. McAffee, The 
Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights Retained l7y the People, 16 S. 
ILL. U. LJ. 267 (1992); Siegel, supra note 177, at 533 (citing McAffee, supra 
note 180); Arthur Wilmarth, Jr., The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights, 26 
AM. CRlM. L. REv. 1261, 1287-89, 1297-98, 1301-03 (1989). 
McMfee, supra note 180, at 1277. Similarly, Earl Maltz said: 
Admittedly, the amendment does seem to suggest that the 
[F]ramers believed that people possessed rights other than those 
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. At the same time, 
however, the language does not indicate that those rights were to 
be protected by the Constitution, but rather from the remainder of 
the Constitution. 
Siegel, supra note 177, at 534 (quoting Earl Maltz, Unenumerated Rights and 
Originalist Methodology, in BARNETT, supra note 6, at 265) (emphasis added). 
Paust, supra note 166, at 244 (quoting James F. Kelley, The Uncertain Renais-
sance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 814, 822 n.36 (1966) (quot-
ing 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 431-32 (G. Hunt ed., 1904»). 
U.S. CaNST. amend. X. 
See generally McAffee, supra note 201, at 356-65. 
Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1,3 (1987). 
See McAffee, supra note 180, at 1307. This perspective believes the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments each secure the design of enumerated powers and 
reserved rights and powers against the threats perceived to flow from listing 
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people's collective and individual rights retained by virtue of the Con-
stitution's grant of limited, enumerated powers to the federal govern-
ment.375 This surmises that it would be nonsensical to apply the 
Ninth Amendment to the states because limits of the federal govern-
ment's enumerated powers define the rights retained under the 
amendment.376 This leads the traditional approach to an abstract 
conclusion that there are no affirmative unenumerated rights and 
that the purpose of the Ninth Amendment is to reduce federal 
power377 and "secure the rights reserved by the Constitution's enu-
375. 
376. 
377. 
exceptions to powers not granted and relying on implication rather than 
express reservation. [d. See generally Berger, supra note 373. 
Thomas B. McAffee, The Federal System as Bill of Rights: Original Understand-
ings, Modern Misreadings, 43 VILL. L. REv. 17, 19 (1998) (citing Griswold, 381 
U.S. at 519-20 (Black,]., dissenting)). 
Cooper, supra note 195, at 76. Charles]. Cooper concluded the Ninth 
Amendment expresses "that the federal government is one of delegated 
powers, and that the enumeration of those powers is a guarantee that the 
American people enjoy unenumerated, and therefore, innumerable, rights 
against the federal government." [d. at 63-64; see also Slaughter, supra note 
174, at 109-lO. This view proprosed "[t]he [N]inth [AJmendment was 
drafted to ensure that the identification and protection of 'other' funda-
mental rights are to remain in the domain of state law, where they resided 
under the Articles of Confederation." [d. 
McAffee, supra note 375, at 26-27. Russell L. Caplan provided another 
structural reading of the Ninth Amendment. He concluded: 
It is ... incorrect ... to view the [N]inth [A]mendment as creating 
rights that may be asserted against either a state or the federal gov-
ernment, because the amendment neither creates new rights nor 
alters the status of pre-existing rights. Instead, it simply provides 
that the individual rights contained in state law are to continue in 
force under the Constitution until modified or eliminated by state 
enactment, by federal preemption, or by a judicial determination 
of unconstitutionality. 
Caplan, supra note 231, at 228. 
"Bork maintains that the Ninth Amendment 'appears to serve a paral-
lel function by guaranteeing that the rights of the people specified already 
in state constitutions were not cast in doubt by the fact that only a limited 
set of rights was guaranteed by the federal charter.'" Pope, supra note 154, 
at 449 (quoting BORK, supra note 15, at 185). The text of the Ninth Amend-
ment quickly refutes Caplan's and Bork's premise. Nothing in the lan-
guage of the amendment designates individual rights as being sustained, as 
is, under state constitutions. A collective right or rights reading of the 
Ninth Amendment also exists. Akhil Reed Amar determined: 
[T]he most obvious and unalienable right underlying the Ninth 
Amendment is the collective right of We the People to alter or 
abolish government, through the distinctly American device of the 
constitutional convention . 
To see the Ninth as centrally about countermajoritarian individual 
rights - such as privacy - is to engage in anachronism. 
Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1200 
(1991). 
Nothing in the language of the amendment points to a collective right 
of the people to alter or abolish the government through the constitutional 
convention. If that was to be the meaning of the Ninth Amendment, would 
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me rated powers scheme."378 
When "interpreting the Constitution, 'real effect should be given to 
all the words it uses.' "379 Therefore, it is inappropriate to state that 
"[t]he Ninth Amendment was not intended to add anything to the 
meaning of the remaining articles in the Constitution."380 To circum-
vent the clear meaning of the text, the traditional approach errone-
ously advocates placing the text "in its historical context"381 or 
searching for "the meaning that would have been the most natural to 
those who framed it."382 That position fails because it places one ap-
propriate supporting doctrine, historical context, and one inappropri-
ate mechanism, the Founders' intent, above and beyond the text. 
As stated above, a consensus of the intent of all those involved in 
drafting, debating, and ratifying the Ninth Amendment cannot be 
found; thus, intent is excluded from the analysis. The traditional ap-
proach's Ninth Amendment text-skipping analysis argues that" [t]he 
Constitution's proponents' belief that limited powers offered impor-
tant security to the people does not imply that they would have agreed 
to an open ended affirmative-rights provision to be enforced by the 
courts."383 There is no need to examine what implication can be made 
from a belief in a government of limited powers when analyzing the 
Ninth Amendment. Implications and beliefs are unnecessary when 
interpreting the plain meaning of the Ninth Amendment. The text of 
the Ninth Amendment prevents denying or disparaging unenumer-
ated rights retained by the people. Accordingly, the amendment con-
tains an open-ended affirmative rights provision that renders 
proposed beliefs on government structure and power to have neither 
not language stating that proposition, or at least something remotely close 
to it, have been chosen instead of the current text? Another approach sug-
gests that additional unenumerated rights exist, "but ... that these rights 
do not achieve constitutional status and are therefore not deserving of con-
stitutional protection." Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1728-29. Lawrence E. 
Mitchell effectively rebutted that position: 
This approach raises several troubling questions. How are these 
enumerated rights insured against denial or disparagement? 
Against whom, if not the government created and limited by the 
Constitution, is protection against denial or disparagement 
needed? And if these unenumerated rights lack constitutional sta-
tus, why is it necessary to acknowledge them in the Constitution? 
This approach ignores the first step in constitutional interpreta-
tion; it ignores the text. 
[d. at 1729. 
378. McAffee, supra note 201, at 380. 
379. Barnett, supra note 182, at 2 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S at 491 (Goldberg, 
J., concurring». 
380. Thapa, supra note 187, at 152 n.80 (quoting EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL 
OF RICHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 63-64 (1957». 
381. McAffee, supra note 180, at 1225. 
382. [d. at 1224. 
383. McAffee, supra note 375, at 26 n.30. 
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authoritative nor persuasive weight.384 Historical understanding can 
supplement legal methodology in order to understand the atmos-
phere and circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Ninth 
Amendment.385 This study, however, cannot trump or obviate an 
analysis of the plain meaning of the Ninth Amendment's text. History 
only places that meaning in its proper act and scene. History is sus-
ceptible to varying interpretations, while the rather explicit text of the 
Ninth Amendment is far less susceptible to varying interpretation. 
The traditional approach also ignores that history is an ongoing 
process. The Ninth Amendment did not apply to the states at its 
adoption.386 However, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies it to the states.387 
Next, the traditional approach argues that affirmative rights propo-
nents do not see the federal structure and a national government of 
limited powers as an alternative, indirect way of securing liberty. 388 
Although individual liberty can, and is, indirectly preserved through a 
national government of limited powers, the direct protection of indi-
vidual liberty through the unenumerated rights retained in the Ninth 
Amendment is a necessity. 
The traditional approach also claims that the first eight amend-
ments of the United States Constitution limit federal power; thus, one 
cannot read the Ninth Amendment to confer unlimited federal judi-
cial power to create new rights. 389 This assessment is incorrect on 
three fronts. First, the Ninth Amendment does not confer unlimited 
federal judicial power because the text and principles of the Ninth 
Amendment establish the boundaries of unenumerated rights claims. 
The federal judiciary has the ability to determine if an unenumerated 
right exists based upon whether the behavior in question was or is an 
unenumerated right through the structure and principles set forth in 
the analytical approach I described above.39o Second, the Ninth 
Amendment does not allow judges to create new rights - the text of the 
Ninth Amendment states that the people already retain them.391 
Third, the first eight amendments limit federal power, as does the 
Ninth Amendment, by preventing the government from denying or 
disparaging unenumerated rights retained by the people.392 
If traditionalists are so concerned with a limited federal govern-
ment and preserving individual liberty, then why do they resist an af-
firmative rights reading of the Ninth Amendment that decreases 
384. Barnett, supra note 182, at 1. 
385. McAffee, supra note 180, at 1225. 
386. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
387. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493; see also McAffee, supra note 201, at 350. 
388. McAffee, supra note 375, at 25. 
389. Berger, supra note 200, at 1510-11. 
390. See supra Part III.E. 
391. Morton, supra note 146, at 752. 
392. U.S. CONST. amend. I-IX. 
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federal power and prevents federal intrusion upon individual liberty? 
Affirmative rights and federalism, in this context, are not mutually ex-
clusive concepts. The Ninth Amendment authorizes a continual 
check on federal power by ensuring that the people retain unenumer-
ated rights.393 The traditional analysis of the Ninth Amendment, 
while posited at affirming liberty through the structure of limited fed-
eral powers, allows for a bigger federal government with large regula-
tory powers that directly encroaches upon individual liberty. This 
leaves traditionalists susceptible to the same credibility criticism that 
originalists receive regarding Ninth Amendment interpretation.394 
Traditionalists propose a Ninth Amendment interpretative theory, 
based on limited federal power, which negates the Ninth Amend-
ment's explicit command for decreased federal control and increases 
the amount of federal power.395 The traditionalist approach, there-
fore, appears to be a political, result-oriented doctrine that is truly 
meant to limit individual autonomy under the Ninth Amendment 
through a conservative jurisprudence. 
If a traditionalist can only state that "the traditional reading of the 
[N]inth [A]mendment has at least as compelling textual and doctri-
nal credentials as the doctrine of substantive due process,"396 she has 
not established much of a foundation to support her premise. 
Thomas A. McAffee,397 a leading proponent of the traditional view, 
completes a thorough analysis, devoid of textual underpinnings, that 
inaccurately emphasizes a historical understanding of the Ninth 
Amendment.39B He improperly relies on Madison's writings, 
speeches, drafts, other Founders' statements, state proposals, and the 
Tenth Amendment to reach his conclusion.399 This legal paradigm 
attempting to determine the meaning of the Ninth Amendment is in-
adequate because, as McAffee admits: 
If the originalist does not justify historically his choice 
among the historical options, his arguments will be com-
pletely un persuasive because they are logically defective: 
without historical justification for his choice, his "use" of his-
tory is nothing but a normative conclusion decorated with 
393. See Saunders, supra note 286, at 818. 
394. See supra notes 171-86 and accompanying text. 
395. See supra notes 389-92 and accompanying text. 
396. McAffee, supra note 180, at 1315. 
397. Thomas B. McAffee currently teaches American Legal History, First 
Amendment Rights, and Constitutional Law at the Boyd School of Law. 
Boyd School of Law Faculty Page, available at http://www.Law.unlv.edu/ 
faculty/facmcaffee_text.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2003). He was previ-
ously a professor at Southern Illinois School of Law teaching similar subject 
matter. Id. McAffee has published several articles in this subject area. Id. In 
2000, his most recent book, Inherent Rights, the Written Constitution, and Papu-
lar Sovereignty-The Founders' Understanding was published. 
398. See generally McAffee, supra note 180. 
399. Id. 
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quotations from the [F] ounders. If he denies or ignores the 
existence of other glausible historical viewpoints, he adds de-
ception to fallacy. 0 
227 
Based on that backdrop, McAffee challenges affirmative rights pro-
ponents to: 
either (1) show grounds for concluding that there is no con-
nection between the state convention proposals and the rati-
fication debates or Madison's drafting of the Ninth 
Amendment, or (2) that at some point during the process of 
drafting and revising the amendment, Madison or other 
members of Congress altered their visions of the 
amendment.401 
The easiest and most authoritative way to rebut this challenge is to 
assert that it is improper to attempt to get inside the minds, actions, 
and behaviors of proponents of state convention proposals, Madison, 
or other members of Congress. As stated earlier, we do not know 
what the overwhelming majority of persons involved in the adoption 
of the Ninth Amendment believed its intent to be because "the Consti-
tution was not written and ratified by a single actor with clear motiva-
tions, but by many participants, most of whom left little or no record 
of their intentions."402 Because we do not know what many persons 
believed the Ninth Amendment to mean, how can McAffee assert that 
affirmative rights advocates must then show that Madison or other 
members of Congress altered their vision of it? Even if we had a clear 
consensus of what all persons believed the Ninth Amendment to 
mean, the amendment's treatment in the House and Senate cannot 
be determined.403 Yet, McAffee wants the affirmative rights advocate 
to superimpose herself in those debates to determine if any person 
altered their vision of what the amendment would do, even though 
the affirmative rights advocate most likely does not know what any 
person's original vision was to begin with. 
Furthermore, no textual basis exists for insisting that the Ninth 
Amendment be read with the Tenth Amendment to conclude that the 
Ninth Amendment protects unenumerated rights, and the historical 
record on this point is inconclusive.404 Moreover, we must remember 
that debates separated the original text, which initially combined the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, into two separate amendments, with 
two separate commandments.405 However, the traditionalist approach 
argues that '" [t] he [N] inth [A] mendment does not specify what 
rights it protects other than by its reference to the enumerated powers 
400. Id. at 1277 (quoting Powell, supra note 343, at 689). 
401. Id. at 1277-78. 
402. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1721. 
403. See supra notes 258-62 and accompanying text. 
404. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1728. 
405. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text. 
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of the federal government.' "406 Proponents of this view believe that 
the Founders used the terms "rights" and "powers" interchangea-
bly.407 This belief is incorrect, because it construes the Ninth Amend-
ment to mean nothing more than what is stated in the Tenth 
Amendment.408 The Tenth Amendment speaks of reserved "powers," 
not "rights" - by contrast, the Ninth Amendment speaks only of 
"rights", not of "powers."409 Recognizing that the people retain cer-
tain rights does not lead to a conclusion that the states retain certain 
powers.4IO Construing the Ninth Amendment as just another version 
of the message set out in the Tenth Amendment would make the 
drafting of the Ninth Amendment a meaningless exercise.411 Tradi-
tionalists do not read the two amendments together; they erase the 
text of the Ninth Amendment and replace it with the text of the 
Tenth Amendment, leaving two duplicate amendments in the Consti-
tution. Therefore, the traditionalists place the limited government, 
reserved powers methodology that they prefer under the heading of 
the Ninth Amendment, which essentially eliminates the Ninth 
Amendment's true text and meaning. 
B. State Constitution Provisions Rebutting the Traditional Approach 
State constitutions further verifY that the Ninth Amendment was 
meant to ensure affirmative rights, not the federal government's struc-
ture of limited powers. The text and history of state constitutions ver-
ify the affirmative rights reading of the Ninth Amendment because, as 
Suzanna Sherry stated: 
After the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, language similar 
to the Ninth Amendment began appearing in state constitu-
tions. Throughout the [N]ineteenth [C]entury, states draft-
ing new constitutions included language mirroring the 
Ninth Amendment's protection of unenumerated rights. It 
is obvious that state constitutions do not need a provision 
safeguarding federalism; the language thus must be inter-
preted in some other way.412 
The existence of these Ninth Amendment analogues in state consti-
tutions directly undermines the view that the Ninth Amendment is a 
406. 
407. 
408. 
409. 
410. 
411. 
412. 
Cooper, supra note 195, at 80. 
McAffee, supra note 180, at 1247. 
BARNETT, supra note 6, at 8. 
Id. 
Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1728. 
Eric M. Axler, The Power of the Preamble and the Ninth Amendment: The Restora-
tion of the People's Unenumerated Rights, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 431, 467 
(2000) (citing Massey, supra note 166, at 307). 
Sherry, supra note 205, at 1151; see also Axler, supra note 411, at 467-68 
("[S]tates have adopted language similar to the Ninth Amendment in their 
own constitutions, and [thus], there is no reason to provide in a state con-
stitution that the federal government is restricted to its limited powers."). 
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rule of construction.413 The presence of Ninth Amendment ana-
logues in state constitutions shows an understanding that the amend-
ment's language is a declaration in favor of rights against the 
government.414 Even an advocate of a traditional approach admits 
that it is difficult to understand why any state would borrow a constitu-
tional provision signifying that the federal government is of limited, 
delegated powers that leaves the states with plenary power.415 
Thirty-two states currently have state constitutional provisions paral-
leling the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and 
the wording in these provisions is strikingly similar to the Ninth 
Amendment.416 Even a cursory review reveals that the Ninth Amend-
ment is certainly the example on which these provisions were based. 
The provisions also mirror the Ninth Amendment in regard to their 
placement in state constitutions. Just as the Ninth Amendment is lo-
cated towards the end of the Bill of Rights, the state constitutional 
provisions are generally placed towards the end of a declaration or bill 
of rights in the first article of the state constitutionY7 This position-
ing is significant because it suggests the amendment's role is as a res-
ervations clause for unenumerated rights. 418 If these amendments 
operated as rules of construction, then we would expect them to be 
placed after the articles vesting the legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers.419 The placement of state unenumerated rights provisions to-
ward the end of a declaration of rights shows that these states believed 
the Ninth Amendment preserved any rights that had not been previ-
ously enumerated in the Constitution.420 
These state constitutional provisions provide authoritative support 
for an affirmative rights reading of the Ninth Amendment. The Ninth 
413. Yoo, supra note 305, at 1009. 
414. Id. 
415. Louis Karl Bonham, Unenumerated Rights Clauses in State Constitutions, 63 
TEX. L. REv. 1321,1331 (1985). 
416. For a thorough treatment of the similarities between the states' constitu-
tional provisions and the Ninth Amendment, see Yoo, supra note 305 and 
Appendix I. 
417. See generally Yoo, supra note 305, at 1010. 
418. Id. 
419. Id. 
420. See generally id. at 1013. New Jersey Constitution provides, "This enumera-
tion of rights and privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny others 
retained by the people." NJ. CONST. art. I, § 21. New Jersey entitles their 
provision a "Savings clause." Id. The title further indicates that the provi-
sion saves other rights and privileges not enumerated in the New Jersey 
Constitution. If the provision only meant that the enumeration of rights 
and privileges were excepted out of state government intrusion, then the 
provision could be entitled the "Structure clause" or the "Rights/Powers 
clause." If the provision is meant to create a line in the sand between the 
enumerated rights of the people and the areas in which state government 
can operate, then there is nothing to save - all rights of the people and 
powers of the state government are forever established, absent a state con-
stitutional amendment. 
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Amendment recognizes the existence of unenumerated rights.421 
The federal government cannot unconstitutionally infringe upon 
these unenumerated rights, just as the federal government cannot un-
constitutionally infringe upon enumerated rights.422 State constitu-
tional provisions paralleling the Ninth Amendment grant state 
citizens unenumerated rights. State governments cannot unconstitu-
tionally infringe upon them, just as state governments cannot uncon-
stitutionally infringe upon enumerated rights. This interpretation of 
the Ninth Amendment and its state counterparts follows the text of 
the constitutional provisions and provides a logical, flowing methodol-
ogy corroborating the balance of power between federal and state gov-
ernment.423 The traditional view deletes and adds text to these 
provisions and creates an illogical methodology wherein the Ninth 
Amendment grants the states plenary power and the majority of states 
redundandyannounce that same point in their own constitutions.424 
Kansas and Ohio's Ninth Amendment analogues defeat the tradi-
tional approach's conjunctive reading of the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendment. They state, "[t]his enumeration of rights shall not be 
construed to impair or deny others retained by the people; and all 
powers, ... not herein delegated, remain with the people."425 That 
text illustrates the distinction between rights and powers. If rights and 
powers are interchangeable, and refer to essentially the same thing, 
why do Kansas and Ohio feel the need to announce a rights provision 
and a powers provision in their constitutions? The powers language, 
coupled with the rights language, shows that the rights retained by the 
people were different than the delegated powers.426 Since rights and 
powers provisions were both put within one amendment, they cannot 
be interchangeable terms. If the text of the Ninth Amendment places 
a line in the sand between protected rights and government power, 
then why is the Tenth Amendment ratified as a separate amendment 
regarding powers, not rights? Kansas and Ohio's constitutions display 
how the traditional reading of the Ninth Amendment creates and 
eliminates constitutional text not provided for in the language of the 
421. Supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text. 
422. Supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text. 
423. Unfortunately, a large number of state judiciaries have also either ignored 
their unenumerated rights constitutional provision or adopted an incorrect 
interpretation of it. This publication is dedicated to the interpretation of 
the federal Ninth Amendment, not its state counterparts. For a review of 
how different states have interpreted their unenumerated rights provisions 
throughout history see Louis Karl Bonham, Unenumerated Rights Clauses in 
State Constitutions, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1321 (1985). 
424. See supra note 412-15 and accompanying text. 
425. KAN. CaNST. art. I, § 20; OHIO CaNST. art. I, § 20. 
426. Yoo, supra note 305, at lO12-13. For a thorough review of Ohio's 
unenumerated rights state constitutional history see supra note 425 at lOl1-
13. 
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Ninth Amendment by deleting rights language and inserting powers 
language. 
Four state constitutions, eight times less then the number of states 
who adopt a Ninth Amendment like provision, contain language satis-
fying the traditional interpretation of the Ninth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.427 Kentucky's constitution provides, "[t]o 
guard against transgression of the high powers which we have dele-
gated, We Declare that everything in this Bill of Rights is excepted out 
of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain invio-
late; and all laws contrary thereto, or contrary to this Constitution, 
shall be void."428 Almost identically, the Texas constitution provides, 
"[t]o guard against transgressions of the high powers herein dele-
gated, we declare that everything in this 'Bill of Rights' is excepted out 
of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain invio-
late, and all laws contrary thereto, or to the following provisions, shall 
be void."429 Similarly, the North Dakota constitution provides, "[t]o 
guard against transgression of the high powers which we have dele-
gated, we declare that everything in this article is excepted out of the 
general powers of government and shall forever remain inviolate."43o 
Pennsylvania's constitution, virtually mirroring North Dakota's consti-
tution, provides "[t]o guard against transgressions of the high powers 
which we have delegated, we declare that everything in this article is 
excepted out of the general powers of government and shall forever 
remain inviolate."431 
These provisions satisfy the traditional perspective. The plain lan-
guage announces that everything in a state bill of rights is excepted 
out of the powers of state government and shall forever remain invio-
late. This language creates the traditionalist's perpetual line in the 
sand between the rights of the people and the powers granted to the 
state government. Under these state constitutions, there are no 
unenumerated state rights available to the people. However, in refer-
ence to Ninth Amendment interpretation, these state constitutional 
provisions show that when the people desire to create a traditional 
approach to rights and powers they complete that goal through lan-
guage fulfilling that proposition that is distinct from the language 
contained in the Ninth Amendment, or the thirty-two state constitu-
tions paralleling the Ninth Amendment. 
The text of the Kentucky, Texas, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania 
state constitution pronouncements would satisfy the traditional inter-
pretation. These amendments provide that the government does not 
have power over matters protected by a state bill of rights. These con-
427. See supra notes 405-08 and infra notes 416 and Appendix 1. 
428. Ky. CONST. § 26. 
429. TEX. CaNST. art. I, § 29. 
430. N.D. CaNST. art. I, § 20. 
431. PA. CaNST. art. I, § 25. 
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stitutions place a structural line between individual liberties protected 
by a state bill of rights and the remaining powers of state government. 
The constitutional text of Kentucky, Pennsylvania, North Dakota, and 
Texas does not indicate that the people retain unenumerated rights. 
These state constitutional provisions are perfect examples of the 
textually unsound traditional reading of the Ninth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. Their text expresses that everything in the 
state bill of rights is excepted out of the general powers of state gov-
ernment; thus, there is no reference to other rights outside those enu-
merated in a state bill of rights. 
The Ninth Amendment has an entirely different text and meaning 
when it reads, "[t]he enumeration in this Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by 
the people."432 The text of the amendment clearly indicates that the 
people retain other rights. Obviously, these other rights must be 
outside the Bill of Rights if they are not enumerated within them. Ac-
cordingly, the text of the Ninth Amendment cannot be read as a struc-
tural statement allotting the people a sealed set of protections in the 
Bill of Rights. If the Founders wanted to close the number and 
amount of rights of the people, they would have adopted text reflect-
ing that meaning. The traditional state constitution provisions are 
perfect examples of that kind of text, which is completely different 
from the text of the Ninth Amendment. 
Fourteen states do not have a constitutional provision adopting lan-
guage mirroring the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion or the traditional approach.433 Those state constitutions' are 
silent on this issue. However, because the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies the Ninth Amendment 
to the states, those states cannot unconstitutionally infringe upon an 
unenumerated federal constitutional right. 
V. CONCLUSION 
An objective reading of the Ninth Amendment should lead to an 
almost universal conclusion - unenumerated rights exist outside those 
enumerated in the Constitution. But it is amazing how the legal com-
munity creates complex issues. Instead of following the Ninth 
Amendment's text, the United States Supreme Court created the sub-
stantive due process tall-tale, and it continues to this day. As we move 
forward with this legal lie, the law's nose grows and grows. It keeps 
trying to cover its tracks with more and more fibs. But the law's con-
science suffers with each fib. If the United States Supreme Court 
432. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
433. CONN. CONST.; DEL. CONST.; IND. CONST.; MAss. CONST.; MINN. CONST.; Mo. 
CONST.; N.H. CONST.; N.Y. CONST.; S.C. CONST.; S.D. CONST.; TENN. CONST. ; 
VT. CONST. ; W. VA. CONST.; WIse. CONST. 
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comes clean, admits its substantive due process fabrication and revital-
izes the Ninth Amendment, a great burden will be removed from its 
shoulders. The Court would then follow the text of the Ninth Amend-
ment as the constitutional provision to determine unenumerated 
rights, thereby ending substantive due process's weak construction 
and ever changing standards and boundaries. Furthermore, this com-
mon sense idea of following the Ninth Amendment's language would 
lead the Court to apply the Ninth Amendment (and the entire Bill of 
Rights) to the states because no state can abridge the privileges and 
immunities of its citizens; thus, eliminating the unpredictable and in-
consistent incorporation doctrine. By following the Ninth Amend-
ment's text, and placing political and personal views aside, two non-
textual doctrines are killed with one stone. 
Consequently, a rare opportunity arises - a modern day chance to 
establish a clear, text-based jurisprudence. This is first accomplished 
by filtering out non-Ninth Amendment claims from any Ninth 
Amendment analysis. Then an adjudication of an unenumerated 
right claim should follow the encompassing views of the Constitution; 
state, federal, and world governments; experts in the particular field; 
and the natural law principles our nation's Founders believed. If the 
alleged right exists, government intrusion upon the right will be ex-
tremely limited. This creates a clear legal paradigm where we must 
start and adhere to the Ninth Amendment's text; recognize valid 
unenumerated rights through an evaluation of the alleged rights 
throughout history; allow the judiciary to determine when an 
un enumerated right has been unconstitutionally abridged; and resist 
the devilish temptation to follow James Madison's alleged intent be-
hind the amendment. When that occurs, the Ninth Amendment will 
be revitalized and substantive due process will cease and desist. 
234 
APPENDIX I 
Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 32 
The state provisions are as follows: ALABAMA STATES: "That this enu-
meration of certain rights shall not impair or deny others retained by 
the people .... " ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36; ALAsKA STATES: "The enu-
meration of rights in this constitution shall not impair or deny others 
retained by the people." ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 21; ARIZONA STATES: 
"The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny others retained by the people." ARIz. CONST. art. 2, 
§ 33; ARKANSAS STATES: "This enumeration of rights shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people and to 
guard against any encroachments on the rights herein retained .... " 
ARK. CONST. art. II, § 29; CALIFORNIA STATES: "This declaration of 
rights may not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the 
people." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24; COLORADO STATES: "The enumera-
tion in this constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to 
deny, impair or disparage others retained by the people." COLO. 
CONST. art. II, § 28; FLORIDA STATES: "The enunciation herein of cer-
tain rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by 
the people." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1; GEORGIA STATES: "The enumera-
tion of rights herein contained as a part of this Constitution shall not 
be construed to deny to the people any inherent rights which they 
may have hitherto enjoyed." GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 28; HAWAII 
STATES: "The enumeration of rights and privileges shall not be con-
strued to impair or deny others retained by the people." HAw. CONST. 
art. I, § 22; IDAHO STATES: "This enumeration of rights shall not be 
construed to impair or deny others retained by the people." IDAHO 
CONST. art. I, § 21; ILLINOIS STATES: "The enumeration in this Consti-
tution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the individual citizens of the State." ILL. CONST. 
art. I, § 24; IOWA STATES: "This enumeration of rights shall not be con-
strued to impair or deny others, retained by the people." IOWA 
CONST. art. I, § 25; KANSAS STATES: "This enumeration of rights shall 
not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people; and 
all powers not herein delegated remain with the people." KAN. 
CONST. art. I, § 20; LOUISIANA STATES: "The enumeration in this consti-
tution of certain rights shall not deny or disparage other rights re-
tained by the individual citizens of the state." LA. CONST. art. I, § 24; 
MAINE STATES: "The enumeration of certain rights shall not impair nor 
deny others retained by the people." ME. CONST. art. I, § 24; MARY-
LAND STATES: "This enumeration of Rights shall not be construed to 
impair or deny others retained by the People." MD. CONST. art. 45; 
MICHIGAN STATES: "The enumeration in this Constitution of certain 
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by 
the people." MICH. CONST. art. I, § 1.1(23); MISSISSIPPI STATES: "The 
enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not be construed to 
deny and impair others retained by, and inherent in, the people." 
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MISS. CONST. art. III, § 32; MONTANA STATES: "The enumeration in this 
constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny, impair, 
or disparage others retained by the people." MONT. CONST. art. II, 
§ 34; NEBRASKA STATES: "This enumeration of rights shall not be con-
strued to impair or deny others, retained by the people, and all pow-
ers not herein delegated, remain with the people." NEB. CONST. art. I, 
§ 26; NEVADA STATES: "This enumeration of rights shall not be con-
strued to impair or deny others retained by the people." NEV. CONST. 
art. I, § 20; NEW JERSEY STATES: "This enumeration of rights and privi-
leges shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the 
people." NJ. CONST. art. I, para. 21; NEW MEXICO STATES: "The enu-
meration in this constitution of certain rights shall not be construed 
to deny, impair or disparage others retained by the people." N.M. 
CONST. art. II, § 23; NORTH CAROLINA STATES: "The enumeration of 
rights in this Article shall not be construed to impair or deny others 
retained by the people." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 36; OHIO STATES: "This 
enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others 
retained by the people; and all powers, not herein delegated, remain 
with the people." OHIO CONST. art. I, § 20; OKLAHOMA STATES: "The 
enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be con-
strued to deny, impair, or disparage others retained by the people." 
OKlA. CONST. art. II, § 33; OREGON STATES: "This enumeration of 
rights, and privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny others 
retained by the people." OR. CONST. art. I, § 33; RHODE ISLAND 
STATES: "The enumeration of the foregoing rights shall not be con-
strued to impair or deny others retained by the people." R.I. CONST. 
art II, § 24; UTAH STATES: "This enumeration of rights shall not be 
construed to impair or deny others retained by the people." UTAH 
CONST. art. I, § 25; VIRGINIA STATES: "The rights enumerated in this 
Bill of Rights shall not be construed to limit other rights of the people 
not therein expressed." VA. CONST. art I, § 17; WASHINGTON STATES: 
"The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny others retained by the people. " WASH. CONST. art. 
I, § 30; and WYOMING STATES: "The enumeration in this constitution, 
of certain rights shall not be construed to deny, impair, or disparage 
others retained by the people." WYo. CONST. art. I, § 36. 
